Iraq

U.S. soldier in Al Asad, Iraq (June 11, 2007). DOD photo. American soldier on patrol in Iraq.

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RECENT ANALYSIS

Dec 2, 2008 The End is in Sight
In this new op-ed published in the Guardian UK, executive director John Isaacs argues that the security agreement signed by the United States and Iraq and approved by the Iraqi parliament last week marks the beginning of the end of the American occupation.
Dec 1, 2008 It's Not Hillary, It's the Policy Stupid!
Those of us eagerly awaiting relief from the debacle called the Bush administration should avoid getting swept up the in DC parlor game of who is getting what position in the new administration and focus instead on the fundamental changes we need the Obama administration to start making. In short, "It's the Policy Stupid!"
Dec 1, 2008 Obama and Clinton: More Agreement than Disagreement on Foreign Policy
President-elect Barack Obama announced on December 1 that he will nominate Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) to be Secretary of State. Exaggerated reporting notwithstanding, the fact is that when it comes to foreign policy, Obama and Clinton agree far more than they disagree. In this analysis, executive director John Isaacs compares Obama and Clinton on Iraq, Iran, missile defense, North Korea, and nuclear nonproliferation.
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John Isaacs

CENTER EXPERT

John Isaacs

Executive Director
202-546-0795 ext.131
jdi AT armscontrolcenter DOT org

Iraq and Afghanistan war costs resources

Before the U.S. invasion in 2003, warnings about an insurgency developing in Iraq after Saddam Hussein's regime fell were ignored by the Bush administration. Lacking training in counterinsurgency operations, U.S. armed forces initially used aggressive offensive tactics employing heavy firepower and ignored the two fundamental principles of counterinsurgency operations: create a secure environment for the civilian population and isolate the insurgents.

This initial lack of planning and strategy, along with an insufficient number of U.S. troops, stoked the insurgency. Tens, and possibly hundreds, of thousands of Iraqi civilian casualties have resulted, which in turn has produced an irreversible backlash of enmity and revenge toward U.S. troops from the families, friends, and other tribal members of the Iraqi dead and wounded.

While the long-term military effects of the "surge" remain uncertain, the Iraqi Parliament's inability to negotiate the political compromises necessary to stabilize the government casts a pall over any long-term prospects for success.