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RECENT ANALYSIS

Leonor Tomero

CENTER EXPERT

Leonor Tomero

Director for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
202-546-0795 ext.119
ltomero AT armscontrolcenter DOT org

Learn about the Project on Strengthening Arms Control and Nonproliferation Click here »

Since entering into force in 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the NPT, has remained the cornerstone of the international nonproliferation regime. In creating a system of mutual responsibilities and an international taboo against the use or threat to use nuclear weapons, the NPT has proven largely successful in stemming proliferation.

But the nonproliferation regime faces new challenges: insufficient protections against the theft or sale of various nuclear materials in states of the former Soviet Union; nuclear black market activity such as the network operated by A.Q. Khan out of Pakistan; threats by North Korea to share nuclear technology with states or non-state actors hostile to the U.S.; and, most recently, violations of IAEA nuclear safeguard standards by Iran, a signatory of the NPT which is pursuing technology for producing nuclear materials as part of a possible quest for a nuclear bomb.

The threat of nuclear terrorism is producing additional challenges to the NPT regime, particularly in the areas of securing and safeguarding nuclear weapons material, as is a pending agreement between the U.S. and India to share peaceful nuclear technology. The U.S.-India deal challenges the legitimacy of the NPT because it would not require India to join the NPT or to undertake any of the disarmament commitments that the P-5 agreed to.

Many experts agree that some type of nonproliferation regime reform is necessary, particularly since certain states have interpreted the NPT as allowing them to acquire nuclear technologies that take them to the brink of acquiring an actual nuclear weapon without explicitly violating the treaty, sometimes referred to as a "breakout capability." Withdrawing from the NPT also carries no penalty, save possible ad hoc action taken by the U.N. Security Council.

Unless nuclear proliferation challenges are effectively addressed and until nuclear weapon states achieve further progress on their disarmament commitments, the future strength of the NPT regime remains in question.

FY2009 DEFENSE BUDGET ANALYSIS

Sep 25, 2008 Analysis of FY2009 Defense Appropriations in the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act (CR) for FY2009

Sep 24, 2008 Analysis of House-Senate Agreement on the FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill (S.3001)

Feb 4, 2008 The FY 2009 Pentagon (DOD) Defense Budget Spending Request

ARTICLES & FACT SHEETS

Aug 19, 2008 The Future of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP): Next Steps

Aug 15, 2008 The Future of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP): Domestic Stakeholders

Aug 4, 2008 The Future of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP): The International Partners

Jun 9, 2008 Memorandum to Obama and McCain: A New Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agenda

Apr 30, 2008 Nuclear Fuel Recycling: More Trouble Than It's Worth

Apr 15, 2008 Potential U.S. Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Fact Sheet

Apr 15, 2008 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Fact Sheet

Mar 5, 2008 History, Design, and Prospects for Improving Pakistan's Nuclear Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)

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