Nuclear Terrorism
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. AP photo.
RECENT ANALYSIS
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Mar 2, 2010
FY 2011 Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Funding
In his historic Prague speech on nuclear weapons, President Obama pledged that the United States would lead “a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.” While last year's budget request was well below what is necessary to begin the hard work of achieving this lofty goal, the administration's Fiscal Year 2011 request includes significant increases for many key threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. -
Dec 9, 2009
Fact Sheet: 2010 Global Nuclear Security Summit
The Global Nuclear Security Summit is scheduled to take place in April 2010 in Washington, D.C. The summit will focus on safeguarding against nuclear terrorism by bolstering international cooperation and improving security for nuclear materials worldwide. -
Jul 15, 2009
Factsheet on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)
Part of President Obama’s ambitious arms control agenda is a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) that would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes. In this new factsheet, Kingston Reif and Madeleine Foley examine the purpose, background, politics, and challenges of the FMCT. - See more articles »
CENTER EXPERT
Leonor Tomero
Director for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
202-546-0795 ext.2104
ltomero AT armscontrolcenter DOT org
Click here to read "Strengthening U.S. Security Through Non-Proliferation and Arms Control: Recommendations for the Obama Administration"
Nuclear terrorism is one of the most serious threats to the security of the United States. The attacks of September 11, 2001 tragically demonstrated the reality of terrorism to the American people, but nearly six years later, serious efforts are still urgently needed to prevent a nuclear attack from occurring in the U.S.
Most experts agree that any nation would take an enormous risk in knowingly providing a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials to a terrorist organization because of the unpredictable consequences of cooperating with a renegade group. If a state-supplied nuclear weapon were ever used against a nuclear-armed state by terrorists, the resultant retaliation against the supplying state would be swift and massive.
If a state didn't knowingly provide a nuclear weapon, how then could terrorists get one?
One way would be to surreptitiously buy or steal an assembled nuclear weapon without the supplying nuclear state's official knowledge. For example, a terrorist group could obtain unaccounted "loose nukes" in Russia without the Duma or the Russian administration having any knowledge of the transaction.
A second way would be for terrorists to obtain enough weapons-grade material to assemble a weapon themselves. A possible source is Russia and the former Soviet Union, where sites with relatively minimal security provide abundant opportunities for terrorists. Assembling the device, however, would pose serious technical challenges to a terrorist group, although securing the services of a renegade nuclear scientist and setting up a makeshift laboratory are not impossibilities.
Efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism include programs such as Cooperative Threat Reduction, commonly known as Nunn-Lugar, aimed at securing and dismantling vulnerable nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union; Global Threat Reduction Initiative, directed at securing and eliminating global high-risk nuclear and radiological materials and equipment; and Materials Protection Control and Accounting Program, geared towards improving security and accounting for highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Russia and the former Soviet Union. While these programs have demonstrated substantial progress in reducing the threat, current estimates conclude that there are still approximately 1,700 tons of HEU and around 500 tons of separated plutonium stockpiled globally (SIPRI Yearbook 2007).
A comprehensive approach is needed to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. Top priorities should include:
- Securing existing nuclear weapons and materials
- Creating the position of "Nuclear Terrorism Czar" at the level of deputy national security advisor in order to coordinate nuclear nonproliferation efforts
- Disrupting terrorist finances
- Developing a contingency plan in case of attack
ARTICLES & FACT SHEETS
Fact Sheet: 2010 Global Nuclear Security Summit
Jul 15, 2009 Factsheet on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)
Nov 14, 2008 Understanding and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism
May 12, 2008 Nuclear Terrorism is a Likely Event
Mar 5, 2008 History, Design, and Prospects for Improving Pakistan's Nuclear Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)
ADDITIONAL READING
- Michael Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism, (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations and Harvard University Press, November 2007).
- Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2007, (Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 2007).
- Ashton Carter, Michael May, and William Perry, "The Day After: Action Following a Nuclear Blast in a US City," The Washington Quarterly 30:4 (Autumn 2007), pp. 19-32.
- Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Joint Statement (U.S. Department of State, June 12, 2007).
- Government Accountability Office, "Nuclear Security: Steps to Better Track and Detect Radioactive Materials," June 19, 2008.