If you thought last year’s version of the bill was bad, this year’s iteration includes a number of proposed funding proposals and policy provisions on nuclear weapons and missile defense that are even more extreme. The purpose of these proposals, spearheaded primarily by Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH), is to:

• constrain and perhaps even block the Pentagon’s ability to implement the New START treaty;
• prevent the President and senior military leaders from making changes to U.S. nuclear posture beyond those outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and agreed to in the New START treaty; and
• drastically increase spending on nuclear weapons programs and national missile defense

Due to opposition in the Senate, the final version of last year’s bill either eliminated or significantly watered down the objectionable House provisions without compromising Congress’ important oversight responsibilities over U.S. nuclear policy. Expect the Senate to raise similar objections again this year, as the latest proposals would greatly undermine U.S. national and economic security.

House Republican efforts to constrain the President’s bipartisan agenda to reduce the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal are unfortunately consistent with previous such GOP attempts to restrict Democratic Presidents since the end of the Cold War. Then, as now, such partisan obstruction threatens to prevent U.S. military leaders from taking common sense steps to put America’s nuclear posture on a post-Cold War footing.

In addition, while Republicans decry the national debt and denounce unnecessary spending, the committee is moving in the opposite direction by adding close to $4 billion for national defense above the administration's request and $8 above the Budget Control act cap, much of it for programs the Pentagon doesn’t want or need now.

Below is a summary of the funding proposals and policy provisions that were debated at the full Committee mark. By unofficial count, a total of 18 amendments were offered on strategic forces issues, 11 of which were decided were decided by roll call votes.

Summary of Amendments

-Rep. Turner (R-OH) amendment #47 authorizing treatment of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) in New Mexico and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) in Tennessee as Pentagon military construction projects (they are currently funded by the National Nuclear Security administration), approved 36-25.

-Second Turner (R-OH) amendment #46 requiring construction of the CMRR by 2024, authorizing $160 million in prior-year funds to continue design of the facility, and prohibiting the use of funds to maintain plutonium capabilities that does not include achieving full operational capability for the CMRR by 2024, approved 38-24. Three Democrats voted aye: Heinrich (NM), Kissell (NC) and Owens (NY).

-Committee adopts as part of an en bloc package an amendment offered by Rep. Sanchez (D-CA) that adds $27 million to the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

-Rep. Garamendi (D-CA) amendment #84 to block funding included in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee mark for an East Coast missile defense site by the end of 2015, failed 29-33.

-Rep. Sanchez (D-CA) amendment #147 to eliminate an additional $358 million included in the Chairman’s mark for the Ground Based Midcourse Defense System, failed 26-36.

-Rep. Sanchez (D-CA) amendment #153 to cut an additional $324 million above the requested level included in the Chairman’s mark for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s weapons activities account, failed 23-39.

-Rep. Lamborn (R-CO) amendment #003 to restrict the ability of the President to sign a future code of conduct in outer space without prior Congressional approval, approved 37-25.

-Rep. Turner (R-OH) amendment #141 on the strategic force posture of the United States approved 34-28. The amendment was 48 pages and is apparently identical to a bill he introduced earlier this year, H.R. 4178. Among other things the amendment would:

• Delay (and perhaps even block) implementation of the New START treaty if funding for nuclear weapons activities at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and strategic delivery system modernization at the Pentagon does not meet the specific levels outlined in the Section 1251 report as proposed in the context of the New START treaty. The report calls for $88 billion in spending on NNSA weapons activities and $125 billion to sustain US nuclear delivery systems between FY 2012 and FY 2021.
• Prohibit any future changes to US nuclear posture and force levels made pursuant to the ongoing NPR Implementation study unless the resources outlined in the 1251 report are requested and appropriated and the sequestration mechanism under the Budget Control Act is overturned.
• Prevent the reduction of nuclear warheads on ICBMs to a single warhead unless the President certifies in writing to the congressional defense committees that the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China are both also carrying out a similar reduction.

-Rep. Johnson (D-GA) amendment #197 requiring reports from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Secretary on whether the reductions required by the New START treaty remain in the national security interests of the United States, failed 27-35.

-Rep. Andrews (D-NJ) amendment #127 to delete provisions included in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee mark reducing health and safety standards at nuclear weapons facilities, failed 27-35.

-Rep. Franks (R-AZ) amendment #43 to study the potential redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and more conventional weapons in East Asia, approved 32-26.

-Rep. Sanchez (D-CA) amendment #209 to strike restrictions included in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee mark on the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, failed 26-33.

-By voice vote, the committee rejected four amendments: Sanchez #152 striking restrictions included in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee mark on funding for the European Phased Adaptive Approach (missile defense in Europe); Sanchez #180 to bar procurement of the Capability Enhancement-II ground based interceptor until the interceptor is successfully flight tested; Sanchez #211 to eliminate provisions included in the Strategic Force Subcommittee mark reducing health and safety standards at nuclear weapons facilities; and Sanchez #150 requiring an independent report on alternatives to maintaining extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, including the removal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.

Other amendments of interest

-Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA) amendment to strike Section 1216 requiring a longer-term deployment of troops in Afghanistan appears to have lost by a vote of 27-34 (seeking confirmation).

-Rep. Palazzo (R-MS) amendment prohibiting gay marriages on military bases approved 37-24.

-Rep. Wittman (R-VA) amendment to ban new rounds of base closings (BRAC) or even plan for base closing approved 44-18.

-Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA) amendment to direct the Pentagon to provide battle-ready dates for all versions of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter by the end of the year was approved by voice vote as an alternative to an Akin (R-MO) to withhold half of the F-35 procurement funds in Fiscal Year 2013 until the Pentagon provides an initial operational capability.

-Rep. Speier (D-CA) amendment to require a General Accountability Office report on the Littoral Combat Ship, including when the service learned of cracks and corrosion, was approved.

-Rep. Conaway (R-TX) amendment to exempt the Defense Department from alternative fuel procurement requirements approved 36-25.

Heritage Foundation President Ed Feulner’s op-ed in the Washington Times on April 23 muddled the history of ballistic missile defense when he blamed President Barack Obama for the inability of the United States to field anything more than a nascent missile defense system. The United States has been developing missile defense systems for almost sixty years without success. Without irony, his solution to persistent cost overruns and schedule delays would be to increase the missile defense budget by nearly 40%, adding an additional three billion dollars a year to an already astronomical price tag. Furthermore, Dr. Feulner approves of the United States’ abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that contributed to strategic stability for forty years by trying to argue that missile defense, if it actually worked, would improve relations between the United States and Russia despite repeated threats from Russian military officials regarding the future of missile defenses in Europe.

A Brief History of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

Signed in 1972, the ABM Treaty restricted the deployment of strategic defensive systems by the United States and the Soviet Union (and later the Russian Federation) to a total of 200 launchers and interceptors at two distinct geographic locations. In 1974, both sides signed an additional protocol to the treaty which reduced the permitted launcher and interceptor deployments to 100 at a single location – we chose to defend an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) field in North Dakota, the Russians chose to defend Moscow. In 1976, the United States deactivated its sole missile defense system because of problems which continue to plague missile defense – namely, extraordinarily high development and operational costs and significant technical hurdles.

The United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in June 2002, ostensibly to gain greater freedom to test missile defense technologies. Between 1999 and June 2002, the United States conducted six intercept tests using its primary missile defense interceptor, the Ground Based Interceptor, deployed as part of the Ground-Based Mid-course Defense (GMD) system. In the nearly ten years since June 2002, the United States has conducted only ten intercept tests. In response to the United States’ withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia announced that it was no longer bound by the conditions of the START II agreement which had it entered into force, would have led to the removal of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles from U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles.

Strategic Defense Initiative – Reagan’s Darling

Dr. Feulner’s assertion that it is the fault of the Obama administration that we have not yet achieved President Reagan’s vision of a robust or comprehensive national missile defense system misrepresents the history of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Designed to be capable of neutralizing incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Strategic Defense Initiative never made if off the ground largely because the numerous sophisticated technologies on which it was to rely had not yet been invented. President Reagan himself admitted that it would likely take decades before his optimistic plans would take shape, but the program relied on unstable technological foundations and proved prohibitively costly.

It could be argued that the Obama administration’s efforts to reformulate missile defense, especially the creation of the “European Phased Adaptive Approach”, (the EPAA) have placed missile defense on a firmer technological footing. However, both the EPAA and GMD remain severely flawed. One proposed alternative would be to methodically test and fix missile defense technology without concurrently deploying systems whose efficacy remains questionable. This would prevent the deployment of unproven and unreliable technologies and would dramatically cut costs.

Dr. Feulner’s conclusion that our “victory” in the Cold War will also be undermined if we do not live up to Reagan’s unrealistic vision of a comprehensive missile defense system presupposes that we are still perpetually standing on the brink of conflict with the Russians or others. He mentions that the Iranians, North Koreans, and Chinese are all expanding their nuclear missile capabilities and that the United States should maintain “comprehensive, multilayered” ballistic missile defenses in order to counter these mounting threats, but he forgets that Iran does not have nuclear weapons or long range missiles on which to deliver them, or that North Korea’s potentially nuclear-capable missiles continue to break apart seconds after launch. The Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Howard “Buck” McKeon, has made the same mistake.

Deterrence Theory and the ABM Treaty

Dr. Feulner also argues that acceptance of the ABM Treaty was tantamount to continuing to promote the policy of mutually assured destruction and that in withdrawing from it the United States can finally leave that antiquated notion in the past. More accurately, the ABM Treaty was designed to provide continued strategic stability by not impinging on the ability of either side to maintain a secure second-strike capability – something that the Russians consistently argue that the EPAA could endanger.

Undersecretary of State for Arms Control Ellen Tauscher has called for a shift away from mutually assured destruction toward “mutually assured stability”, but Russia continues to make egregiously threatening statements regarding European missile defense. The United States’ refusal to allow Russia joint command and control over European missile defenses and the administration’s inability to obtain a legally binding (read: ratified in Congress) treaty that assures the Russians that the EPAA will not target Russian strategic forces will remain major stumbling blocks to further bilateral arms control talks – all over a system that cannot reliably defend Europe or the United States.

Lessons Not Learned

Dr. Feulner concludes by acknowledging that a decade since we unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (AMB) Treaty, we should be far beyond our current rudimentary missile defense capabilities. On this point, at least, we can agree – the state of our missile defense capabilities is poor given the billions of dollars and years of effort we have devoted to its development. The solution, however, is not to throw good money after bad, but instead to stop further deployments until fundamental technological challenges are overcome.

Matthew Fargo is an intern at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

The bottom line: Bipartisanship is alive and well on Capitol Hill - at least when it comes to robust support for nuclear material security.

Both the House and Senate bills increase funding above the Obama administration’s requested level for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the key program in the effort to secure all vulnerable materials around the world at an accelerated rate. The FY 2013 budget request for GTRI was $32 million less than the FY 2012 enacted level, and revealed big delays in some critical scheduled activities in the outyears, such as the conversion of research reactors around the world that use highly enriched uranium to use low enriched uranium, which cannot be used in a nuclear weapon. The Senate bill added $73 million above the request; the House bill added approximately $17 million.

The Senate bill also boosts funding for the International Nuclear Materials Protection (INMPC) account by $57 million above the requested level, primarily to restore funding to INMPC’s Second Line of Defense program, which was dramatically reduced from last year. The Second Line of Defense program installs radiation detectors and other equipment to detect the illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction at border crossings, airports, and seaports around the world.

Senate Energy and Water Subcommittee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Ranking Member Lamar Alexander (R-TN) and House Energy and Water Subcommittee Chairman Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) and Ranking Member Pete Visclosky (D-IN) deserve credit for prioritizing NNSA’s core nuclear material security and nonproliferation programs, which keep our nation safe from the threat of nuclear terrorism. The increases proposed by the House were particularly noteworthy, since the House reduced funding for GTRI and INMPC from the request the previous two fiscal years.

In addition, both bills scaled back the administration’s one-time request of $150 million for USEC to further develop and demonstrate the technical feasibility of domestic national security-related enrichment technologies, which does not contribute to the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials and could actually undermine US nonproliferation objectives. This funding was included in the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account despite the fact the technology is aimed at meeting the needs of programs funded in different parts of the NNSA budget. The House decreased the request by $50 million while the Senate removed the program from the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account entirely, instead authorizing the Secretary of Energy to transfer up to $150 million in NNSA funds for the project.

The House bill also reduced the administration’s request for the controversial Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel program by $153 million below the requested level of $888 million. The MOX program is part of the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account even though it isn’t a core nuclear terrorism prevention program. The program continues to be plagued by cost overruns and schedule delays, and the Department of Energy has yet to receive a commitment from any utility to use the fuel. Though the Senate funded MOX at the requested level, it raised concerns about NNSA’s management of the program.

For a detailed review of the funding levels for the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account, click on our handy chart below:

The two bills now go to the House and Senate floor, perhaps as soon as the week of May 7. The intent of the two subcommittee chairs, Rep. Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) and Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), and the ranking members is to finish the House-Senate conference on a final bill, which will iron out whatever differences exist between the two bills, by the week of July 30. They may be delayed by the larger budget politics that will impact all the appropriations bills for fiscal year 2013.

News Analysis: N. Korea Launches Rocket, Kills U.S. Deal

By Duyeon Kim

Defying international warnings, North Korea on April 13 fired a three-stage Unha-3 rocket with the aim of launching a satellite into orbit. The rocket failed and exploded into about 20 pieces over the West Sea (Yellow Sea) between the Korean peninsula and China, according to South Korean military officials. The launch, in effect, shattered a Feb. 29 deal made with the United States on halting all missile and nuclear activities.

It was Pyongyang’s fourth failed attempt to test its long-range ballistic technology and its third failed satellite launch since 1998. In contrast to the two previous satellite launches, the North admitted to the Unha-3’s failure despite a publicity campaign that included inviting journalists to view the rocket and satellite.

The Unha-3’s first explosion came in the first one to two minutes of takeoff, and the second came after about eight minutes, according to South Korean military officials, leading analysts to believe the rocket’s failure occurred in its first stage. This is a setback from its third-stage malfunction in 2009, although technical experts say failures are common in rocket and missile development.

The North’s repeated failures suggest it is still a long way from fielding a long-range missile capable of reaching the United States, easing fears of this possible threat.

Two days after the launch, Pyongyang rolled out what appeared to be new missiles in its military parade celebrating the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung, the regime’s late founder. Some news reports initially speculated they were mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), recalling comments last June by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates about a potential road-mobile ICBM. Specialists on North Korean missiles, however, have dismissed them as mock-ups.

Attention quickly shifted to the vehicles carrying the missiles, amid suspicions that they came from China, North Korea’s main patron. If the suspicions prove to be true, China, a UN Security Council member, could be violating council resolutions it helped pass that ban transfers to North Korea of “resources that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programs or activities.” According to Japanese media on April 26, a Chinese firm sold eight such vehicles to the North last May.

When asked about potential Chinese assistance to North Korea’s missile program during an April 19 House Armed Services Committee hearing, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said, “I’m sure there’s been some help coming from China,” adding that he did not know the extent of such aid.

Immediately after the North’s rocket launch, Washington halted its plans to ship 240,000 tons of nutritional assistance to the impoverished country. The aid was part of the February deal.

UN Security Council Resolution 1874, supported by China and Russia after Pyongyang’s 2009 rocket and nuclear tests, “demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology.” This means any long-range rocket and satellite launch would be considered a ballistic missile test. In Resolution 1718, passed in 2006, the council “decide[d] that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program…[and] abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programme[s] in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.” The council’s unanimous decision to use the terms “any launch using ballistic missile technology” indicated a consensus, which still exists, that an attempt to launch a satellite into orbit is part of an effort to mount a nuclear warhead on a missile.

U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Glyn Davies is said to have clearly reminded his North Korean counterpart, Kim Gye Gwan, of the meaning of this provision during February talks. Sources say, however, the young Kim Jong Un, the country’s new leader, was unable to defy his late father and predecessor’s command to complete the rocket launch, which was timed to mark the Kim Il Sung centennial and proclaim North Korea to be a “strong and prosperous nation.”

Security Council Condemnation

On April 16, the Security Council released a president’s statement, which requires unanimous support, strongly condemning the launch and directing fresh sanctions against North Korean entities and individuals.

The statement was the strongest of its kind, using sharper language than the one adopted after Pyongyang’s April 2009 rocket launch. The language changed from “condemns” in 2009 to “strongly condemns” in 2012, and its description of the act hardened from a “contravention” to a “serious violation” of past resolutions. In the latest president’s statement, the council also “deplore[d] that such a launch has caused grave security concerns in the region.”

A key element of the Security Council statement is the use of a “trigger” clause, in which the council “expresses its determination to take action accordingly in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test.” Although a Security Council statement is not legally binding, the provision lays the groundwork for a swift sanctions resolution in the event of a future nuclear or missile test.

The inclusion of the trigger clause is also significant in that Beijing has not blocked it, which may reflect Chinese disappointment after failed attempts in 2006 and 2009 to dissuade North Korea from launching missiles.

In stark contrast to 2009, however, this year’s Security Council statement does not call for the early resumption of the six-party talks or even mention that process, in an apparent reflection of Washington’s hardened stance. China, Japan, the two Koreas, Russia, and the United States are involved in those talks.

The council’s statement came just three days after the North’s launch, a job that required eight days in 2009. The quicker response suggests less time for the council to overcome Chinese opposition.

At the same time, however, Beijing may not easily abandon Pyongyang’s strategic value. Although the essence of Chinese-North Korean ties is likely to remain unchanged, some experts say there may be some changes in the way they are maintained, particularly in dealing with a young, new leader after the death of Kim Jong Il.

Beijing’s support for tough Security Council action was followed by its own Foreign Ministry statement calling for dialogue and the implementation of the Feb. 29 agreement between Washington and Pyongyang.

In a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement carried by the country’s state media, Pyongyang rejected the Security Council’s condemnation as “unreasonable” and reasserted its right to a “peaceful” civilian space program. Accusing the United States of leading a campaign to deny it that right, Pyongyang pledged to continue with space launches and vowed to abandon the February agreement.

“We have thus become able to take necessary retaliatory measures, free from the agreement,” the statement said. “The U.S. will be held wholly accountable for all the ensuing consequences.”

Tougher Stances, New Approach?

Previous North Korean provocations led to a flurry of diplomacy to resume talks. This time, Washington does not seem eager to return to negotiations. Instead, North Korea’s rocket launch seems to have triggered a different approach in the way the United States and South Korea deal with Pyongyang. Instead of initiating more talks with the regime and trying to prevent its every move in its nuclear and missile game, the two allies are aiming at Pyongyang’s human rights violations and the livelihoods of the North Korean people.

“North Korea is only further isolating itself by engaging in provocative acts, and is wasting its money on weapons and propaganda displays while the North Korean people go hungry,” according to a White House statement released shortly after the North’s rocket launch.

“The cost of firing one missile is equivalent to six years’ worth of much-needed food and enough money to buy 2.5 million tons of corn,” said South Korean President Lee Myung-bak in an April 16 radio address. South Korean intelligence estimates that the Unha-3 rocket show cost $850 million.

The statements may represent a shift in approach because they strike at a fundamental element of the North Korean regime, sources said.

Washington has made it clear that there will not be any more dialogue but more pressure if North Korea continues with provocations, and the Department of State says Washington is considering its own sanctions in addition to the ones directed under the latest Security Council president’s statement. “We will continue to keep the pressure on them and they’ll continue to isolate themselves until they take a different path,” President Barack Obama said in an April 13 interview with Telemundo.

It seems clear Washington no longer will initiate dialogue with Pyongyang. It remains to be seen if Beijing or Moscow will attempt to arrange a future meeting. In the United States, advocates of engagement are hardening their positions. “Nuclear diplomacy with North Korea is at a dead end. Containing Pyongyang is Washington’s only realistic option,” Leon Sigal, director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York, wrote in The National Interest on April 19.

The biggest variable in the new paradigm is a third nuclear test or successful long-range missile launch. Either of those can be expected to lead to significant changes in policy toward North Korea.

Tensions have spiked on the peninsula with continued threats by the North against the South. On April 23, North Korea’s military warned of a “nationwide sacred war” to wipe out South Korea for insulting its new leader’s dignity. It threatened to take “special actions soon” through “unprecedented means and methods of [their] own style.” The regime renewed its threats on April 26, warning of damage far greater than its attacks against the South’s Yeonpyeong Island in 2010.

The threats hit back at comments made by South Korean President Lee Myung-bak after the North’s rocket launch regarding its collective farm system and lack of attention to human rights and defector issues.

Meanwhile, media reports have cited government officials and experts predicting an imminent nuclear test. Many analysts even expect a nuclear device using highly enriched uranium (HEU) to further up the ante. North Korea’s previous behavioral pattern suggests the regime may conduct another nuclear test, although that is dependent on time and circumstance. Pyongyang’s nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 were preceded by missile and rocket launches.

The main technical motivation for continued nuclear testing would be to miniaturize a nuclear warhead and mount it on a missile, technical experts say. Former Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Siegfried Hecker, who has visited North Korea’s primary nuclear complex on several occasions, said in an April 13 Stanford University brief, “I believe North Korean scientists and engineers have been working to design miniaturized warheads for years, but they will need to test to demonstrate that the design works.”

North Korea’s plutonium stockpile has shrunk with its two nuclear tests, and the regime has halted plutonium production since the disablement of key facilities under the six-party talks. Therefore, a plutonium nuclear test may signal satisfactory operations in its uranium-enrichment activites.

Little is known about the North’s uranium-enrichment capabilities, but a uranium nuclear test could indicate an operational uranium-enrichment program, successful production of HEU in sufficient quantities, and a bomb design. All this would equip Pyongyang to build up larger stocks of weapons-grade material.

From a nonproliferation standpoint, a uranium test would have serious implications.

A key question is whether Pyongyang has the political motivation to follow through with any nuclear test in the near future in the face of tougher international attitudes after its unsuccessful rocket launch last month.

© 1997-2012 Arms Control Association

A new round of talks with Iran has ended with modest progress -- particularly compared to previous futile attempts. The United States and its allies have agreed to meet again with Iran in Baghdad, May 23, ensuring that the diplomatic process will continue.

In the meantime, pressure will continue to build on Iran. With even stronger US and European Union sanctions set to come into force this summer, and the burden of current sanctions still weighing heavily on Tehran, the incentive to compromise could be greater than ever.

In a promising turn of events, reports indicate that Iran demonstrated a willingness to stick to the subject of its nuclear program and did not insist on counterproductive preconditions, as it has in the past. "If there is goodwill, one can pass through this process very easily and we are ready to resolve all issues very quickly and simply," Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi said in an interview Monday. But it is unclear what “goodwill” will be forthcoming. The six world powers will expect to see meaningful Iranian confidence building measures before agreeing to ease sanctions.

If a solution is to be reached, each side will need to compromise; this cannot be a zero-sum game. At this point, experts from each side will work to come up with a set of concrete measures to be considered. Stemming Iran’s stockpiling of medium-enriched uranium is the most urgent near-term priority, and must be a part of any early confidence building steps. But from Iran’s perspective, some incentive will need to be provided. This might include the provision by the United States and its allies of fuel for Iran’s Tehran Research Reactor or the promise to delay tougher sanctions. This “diplomatic window” is an important moment in ongoing negotiations.

At the conclusion of talks in Istanbul, President Obama remarked that, “Now, the clock is ticking and I’ve been very clear to Iran and to our negotiating partners that we’re not going to have these talks just drag out in a stalling process.” But it is important to keep in mind that diplomacy does not happen in a day. In order to reach agreement, the two sides will need to remain committed to dialogue and undergo extensive bargaining.

There are some indications that the parties see hope on the horizon. European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton remarked after the talks that, “We want now to move to a sustained process of serious dialogue, where we can take urgent practical steps to build confidence and lead on to compliance by Iran with all its international obligations.” She went on to say that the group would be guided by a “step-by-step approach and reciprocity.” This positive attitude has not always been the case after talks with Iran, and gives some indication that the international community may be willing to reward Iran if it moves to alleviate the concerns surrounding its nuclear program.

Importantly, there is time for this negotiating process to continue. Experts continue to assess that even under the most optimal circumstances, it would take at least a year for Iran to produce a testable nuclear weapon, and considerably longer to develop the means to deliver it. Even more, US and European intelligence officials have stated their belief that, though Iran may be working toward some form of nuclear capability, there is no evidence that they have made the decision to build a nuclear weapon.

It is important to remember that diplomacy takes time, and in the case of Iran, plenty of time still remains. The steps taken by the US and its allies to pursue a diplomatic solution are laudable. The international community should be given the space to press forward and seek a final agreement. This is the best way to deal with the unwanted potential for a nuclear Iran.

A mixture of geography and nationalism has set the stage in the United Kingdom for a referendum in 2014 that will ask voters a straightforward question with complex consequences: Should Scotland be an independent nation?

A complicating factor for the referendum is that while the United Kingdom is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a recognized nuclear weapon state in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the strategic nuclear weapons forces which it possesses are all located on submarines based in Scotland. The majority party in the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish National Party, has declared that if they achieve independence in 2014, they would call for the unilateral removal of nuclear weapons from Scotland.

British nuclear forces are comprised solely of four Vanguard class ballistic missile submarines, each armed with up to sixteen Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles. With ten warheads on each missile and a single Vanguard submarine deployed at a time, the United Kingdom maintains 160 operational warheads, and has declared that it will not exceed a maximum of 225 operational warheads at a given time.

The possibility of Scottish independence brings into serious question the future of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent. According to William Walker, there is no other existing submarine base in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland that would be able to host the United Kingdom’s Vanguard ballistic missile submarines. As the referendum nears and it becomes clearer whether it is likely to pass, there will undoubtedly be a more vigorous search for other basing alternatives within the U.K. Ministry of Defense and Parliament.

It has also been reported that an independent Scotland would find it difficult to field much in the way of a modern military force on par with countries of approximately the same size in Europe. Although the Scottish National Party has opposed the membership of an independent Scotland in NATO for years, First Minister of Scotland Alex Salmond may change course in order to ensure the future security of Scotland. Defense experts in the U.K. have speculated that Scotland would be unable to bar British nuclear submarines from its bases if it expects to become a full member of NATO.

Meanwhile, the United Kingdom continues to debate the wisdom of building new ballistic missile submarines at an estimated cost of £25 billion ($39.6 billion). The British American Security Information Council established an independent commission to examine the future of the United Kingdom’s nuclear forces and found that the elimination of Trident from the military budget would save approximately £1.6 billion ($2.5 billion) annually for the next fifty years.

Although studies have been conducted into potential alternatives, Defense Secretary Liam Fox announced in 2011 that plans to begin a “like for like” replacement of the existing ballistic submarine force are already underway but the final decision will not be made until 2014.

The United Kingdom’s maintenance of continuous at-sea deterrence has existed since the 1960s, but alternatives such as creating a dual-use submarine force to replace the aging Trident system or maintaining a far cheaper non-deployed strategic force have been suggested. However, there is an even better solution – British nuclear disarmament.

The future of the United Kingdom’s strategic forces has been debated in Parliament in the past. Some Members of Parliament have declared that nuclear weapons “serve no useful or practical purpose” defending the United Kingdom from “the most pressing threat currently facing the U.K.” – terrorism. Furthermore, although the United Kingdom envisions its strategic forces as an independent nuclear deterrent, it continues to rely on the United States for technical support and cooperation. Defense Secretary Fox has insisted that, "Policy remains that a minimum nuclear deterrent based on the Trident missile delivery system and continuous at-sea deterrence is right for the U.K." In his autobiography, former Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote that, “In the final analysis, I thought giving [Trident] up too big a downgrading of our status as a nation, and in an uncertain world, too big a risk for our defense.”

British disarmament would also divorce the power and prestige of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council from the possession of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the United Kingdom would be the first Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) recognized nuclear weapons state to fulfill its NPT Article VI obligation to “pursue negotiations in good faith…to nuclear disarmament”.

Although this would only be a small step toward total global nuclear disarmament, it could serve as an important example for moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons cannot rebuild ailing economies, cannot bridge cultural divides, cannot defend against terrorism, and no longer serve the national interests of the United Kingdom.

Let Trident rust in peace.

Matthew Fargo is an intern at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Here is an excerpt from the piece:

The CTBT is not the only compelling reason for the U.S. to devote the necessary resources to nuclear test monitoring around the world, notwithstanding the constraints of “sequestration” or tight budgets generally. The nuclear test detection capabilities described by the NRC are indispensible with or without a CTBT. Given the world’s justifiable concern about Iran obtaining nuclear weapons, for example, the U.S. should be sure that it maintains the ability to detect a surprise nuclear test by Tehran.

Read the full article here.

The U.S. and its European allies are set to begin a new round of negotiations with Iran this weekend, but while the U.S. enters the discussion in a position of strength, it is unclear whether real progress can be achieved in the near term. The talks, which will take place in Istanbul, mark the first direct negotiations on Tehran’s nuclear program since previous talks collapsed more than 14 months ago. But though the reopening of dialogue is a clear first step, and may present a unique opportunity on the road to a final solution, the U.S. and its allies will need to pursue further diplomatic efforts in order to achieve a breakthrough.

There is some reason to believe that these talks may hold more promise than those of the past. Burdened by ever-tightening sanctions and the increasing threat of attack,Tehran may be more willing to negotiate. Early this week, Iran’s nuclear chief, Fereidoun Abbasi, indicated that Iran might stop its production of 20 percent enriched uranium, but would prefer to continue to enrich uranium to lower levels for power generation. The enrichment issue lies at the heart of the dispute, since weapons-grade enrichment can be achieved more easily from 20 percent, fueling Western concerns that Tehran may be seeking an atomic weapon.

The U.S., also, has shown some willingness to compromise in recent weeks. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told ABC News on April 3 that "it's our very strong belief, as President Obama conveyed to the Israelis, that it is not in anyone's interest for them to take unilateral action. It is in everyone's interest for us to seriously pursue at this time the diplomatic path," and on April 5 David Ignatius reported the president’s willingness to “accept an Iranian civilian nuclear program if Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei can back up his recent public claim that his nation ‘will never pursue nuclear weapons.’”

But these possibilities are still clouded by threats and mistrust on both sides. On Sunday, the New York Times laid out the negotiating position of the U.S. and its allies, including the demand that Iran shut down and eventually dismantle its underground enrichment facility at Fordow. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi was quoted on the Iranian parliament’s website as saying that while he hopes for some progress in the upcoming talks, the attempt to impose any preconditions would be “meaningless.” While both countries have laid out early positions, the likelihood of a final solution any time soon is doubtful.

Each side enters these negotiations with a long list of grievances. The only way to overcome these hurdles will be through a sustained diplomatic process, on both the bi-lateral and multi-lateral level, that has not yet been given an opportunity. With just two attempts at dialogue in as many years, this weekend’s discussion will be successful if it can simply set the stage for ongoing negotiations.

Regardless of the failure of past attempts, an opportunity exists today that has not before, with limited political space seemingly open in both the U.S. and Iran for compromise. Under the strongest sanctions ever, Iran’s currency has lost more than 40% of its value, forcing the country to postpone billions in new energy projects because of the impact on their economy. Dozens of Iran’s banks have been cut off from the international finance system.

Meanwhile, the American public, war-weary and worried about economic conditions, continues to oppose military action against Iran, favoring sanctions and diplomacy by a large margin, and the Pentagon appears skeptical of the use of force. The Obama Administration has reason to avoid escalation and seek diplomatic progress, particularly in an election year.

This meeting is a clear first step in what will be a long process, but a process that provides an opportunity to deliver real change. While there is no clear solution in sight, each side has more reason than ever to come to the table, and remain until a solution has been reached.

Prominent among my teachers were those who had been in the desert of Alamogordo at the first nuclear test, the day the nuclear age was born. They drew two lessons. Both lessons seem in danger of being forgotten in the debate over Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

The first was that nuclear weapons will have succeeded in their purpose if they are never used. The second lesson followed from the first; our future, if we are to have one, must be subject to restraint — this being a plea for international law.

The hope for peace, for the present, lies in deterrence based on the fact that nuclear war would leave no victors. Deterrence has been put to the test for three-quarters of a century. Its central premise has been recognized by such dysfunctional states as the former Soviet Union and the present North Korea. It must serve, till we reclaim our dignity by embodying restraint in law.

If proof is needed of faith in deterrence, it is to be found in the behaviour of the world’s nine nuclear weapons states (U.S., Russia, U.K., France, China, India, Pakistan and, undeclared, Israel and North Korea) which continue to spend on weapons modernization in their appetite for deterrence. Those who lived through the depressing parade in which these nuclear powers made their appearance, will recall that none was welcomed. The international community raised every impediment — political, legal, technical and economic (this last through sanctions) — that they could. Then they accepted what they could not alter.

The second, more hopeful, message of the atomic age is the need for international law. In two world wars almost 100 million perished. This led, at long last, to a commitment through the United Nations to a world subject to measures of agreed law.

This is relevant to the present predicament in respect of Iran. The UN Charter permits us to oppose the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran in every possible way — except one. The exception is the resort to war. But confused rhetoric is bringing war ever nearer.

A recent full-page open letter to President Barack Obama in the Washington Post by a respected group of retired U.S. generals (March 5, 2012; ‘Mr. President: Say no to war of choice with Iran’) gives evidence of that confusion. “Unless we or an ally is attacked, war should be an option of last resort,” the generals say. They are attempting to stem the tide toward war with Iran, but in referring to war as “an option of last resort” they could fail in their purpose. Their premise — “Unless we or an ally are attacked” — makes their “option of last resort,” the pre-emptive bombing of Iran, no option at all.

We must look elsewhere in the generals’ letter for its true message. “The U.S. military,” they say, “is the most formidable military force on earth. But not every challenge has a military solution.” Iran is a case in point.

Article 51 of the UN Charter permits a state to act in “self-defence if armed attack occurs.” Authorities hold this to mean (following Britain’s former attorney general, Lord Goldsmith) that this “permits the use of force in self-defence against an imminent attack, but does not authorize the use of force to mount a pre-emptive strike.” Since law stands or falls by precedent, an attack on Iran that failed to meet these criteria would undermine the rule of law.

There is more to consider. It is widely agreed that an attack with penetrating bombs on Iran’s nuclear installations might set the country’s nuclear weapons program (if such exists) back by one to three years. Following that, a decision would have to be made whether to acquiesce in Iran’s nuclear ambitions — by then real and unalterable — or launch a second attack in a Middle East enraged by the first. The precedent we would be helping establish by further bombing is that of pre-emption at will.

Regrettably, Obama has been persuaded to say that the a policy of containment of a nuclear Iran is “no longer on the table.” That being the case, a new word for containment must be found. That word is deterrence.

John Polanyi has long been involved in international debate on nuclear issues. He is a professor of chemistry and Nobel Laureate at the University of Toronto.