In 2008, the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation sought input from 60 scientists, academics, members of Congress, senior congressional staffers, and representatives from advocacy groups, think tanks, and foundations to assess the priorities for the next Administration on nuclear arms control and non-proliferation. This report summarizes the consultations.

Click here to download the full report (PDF, 19 pages)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TOP THREE RECOMMENDATIONS

• Provide a new direction on nuclear weapons policy that emphasizes “minimum deterrence,” extend the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and signal intent to pursue negotiations with Russia on further reductions.
• Issue a statement explaining a new vision for nuclear weapons policy and guidance for the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review. The statement should include the intent to pursue nuclear weapons reductions and a reiteration that the only role for nuclear weapons is “minimum deterrence” – deterring the use of nuclear weapons against the United States or U.S. allies.
• Extend START I and begin bilateral negotiations with Russia on further permanent, legally-binding, and verifiable reductions toward a goal of 1,000 deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons per side or fewer. Send a special envoy to Russia or appoint a working group to signal U.S. intent to maintain verification provisions and move toward reductions.

• Announce intent to secure all vulnerable fissile material in four years as the best way to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. Accelerate and prioritize these efforts accordingly and appoint a senior official to coordinate threat reduction efforts.

• Announce intent to seek ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and begin working to build the bipartisan support in the Senate needed for approval.

NEXT TIER RECOMMENDATIONS

• Announce intent to negotiate with Iran without preconditions.
• Recommit to promises (“13 Steps”) made at the 1995 extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and re-affirmed in 2000, and announce intent to fulfill these promises in the first term.
• Condition further deployment of ground-based midcourse missile defense in Europe on further tests that can confirm the effectiveness of the system.
• Begin efforts to create a new independent agency, or reform the current State Department structure, to deal more effectively and at a higher level with arms control and non-proliferation.

PARTICIPANTS

The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, in conjunction with the New America Foundation, hosted six meetings co-chaired by Lt. Gen. Robert Gard (USA, ret.), chairman of the Center, and Senator Gary Hart, chairman of Council for a Livable World. In addition, the Center conducted interviews with ten Members of Congress and senior congressional staffers.

Our efforts were made possible through the generous support of the Connect U.S. Fund

DISCLAIMER: Not all participants made recommendations and not all participants endorsed or agreed with the recommendation or the priority of the recommendations. These recommendations reflect the overwhelming consensus from the discussions but not necessarily the view of the individual participants.

Note: Senior congressional staff members and other experts who preferred to remain unnamed were consulted as part of this project.

Lt. Gen. Robert Gard (USA, Ret.)
Chairman
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Senator Gary Hart (D-CO)
Chairman
Council for a Livable World

John Isaacs
Executive Director
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Leonor Tomero
Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Kingston Reif (Rapporteur)
Former Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Robert Alvarez
Senior Scholar
Institute for Policy Studies

Joe Cirincione
President
Ploughshares Fund

Paul Castleman
Secretary-Treasurer and Board Member
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Deepti Choubey
Deputy Director, Nonproliferation Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Alice Day
Board Member
Council for a Livable World

Lincoln Day
Board Member
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Rudy deLeon
Senior Vice President of National Security, Center for American Progress
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense (2001)

Laurie Dewey
Vice-President and Board Member
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Charles Ferguson
Phillip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology
Council on Foreign Relations

Brian Finlay
Senior Associate
Stimson Center

Nancy Gallagher
Associate Director for Research, Center for International and Security Studies
University of Maryland

Richard Garwin
IBM Fellow Emeritus
Thomas J. Watson Research Center

Amb. Thomas Graham, Jr.
Chairman and Co-Founder, Cypress Fund for Peace and Security
Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (94-97)

Phillip Karber
Adjunct Faculty Member, Georgetown University
Former Strategy Advisor to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Founding Director of the Department of Defense Strategic Concepts Development Center

Daryl Kimball
Executive Director
Arms Control Association

Col. Richard Klass (USAF, Ret.)
President
Veterans Alliance for Security and Democracy

Sam Knight
National Advisory Board Member
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Lawrence Korb
Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense (81-85)

Bonnie Jenkins
Program Officer for U.S. Foreign and Security Policy
The Ford Foundation

Jim Leach
John L. Weinberg Visiting Professor of Public and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University
Former U.S. Representative

Amb. James Leonard
Member of the Scientists Working Group, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Former Assistant Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) (69-73)

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)
Chairman of Senate Armed Services Committee
U.S. Senate

Jeffrey Lewis
Director, Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative
New America Foundation

Terri Lodge
Director of Government Affairs
Ploughshares Fund

Priscilla McMillan
Member of the Board of Directors
Council for a Livable World

Katherine Magraw
Director
Peace and Security Funders Group

Robert Nelson
Senior Scientist, Global Security Program
Union of Concerned Scientists

Ivan Oelrich
Vice President, Strategic Security Programs
Federation of American Scientists

Alan Pearson
Director, Biological and Chemical Weapons Control Program
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Senator Jack Reed (D-RI)
Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee
U.S. Senate

Douglas Shaw
Associate Dean for Planning, Research, and External Relations
Assistant Professor of International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs
The George Washington University

Eric Schwartz
Executive Director
Connect U.S. Fund

Ivo Spalatin
Secretary-Treasurer and Board Member, Council for a Livable World
Former Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)

Leonard Spector
Deputy Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies
Former Assistant Deputy Administrator for Arms Control and Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration

Representative John Spratt (D-SC)
Chairman of House Budget Committee
U.S. House of Representatives

John D. Steinbruner
Director, Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland
Former Member of the Defense Policy Board, Department of Defense (93-97)

Guy Stevens
Chief Operating Officer
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Frank von Hippel
National Advisory Board Member, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Professor of Public and International Affairs, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University
Co-Chair, International Panel on Fissile Materials

Leonard Weiss
National Advisory Board Member, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Consultant to Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and Former Staff Director of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee

Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI)
Member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. Senate

Jules Zacher
Board Member
Council for a Livable World

Snowflakes have begun falling on Washington, D.C. And I don't mean the kind that will have us all humming along to Bing Crosby. I'm talking about Donald Rumsfeld-style snowflakes, the endless stream of memos the former Secretary of Defense used to churn out to his Pentagon subordinates, often at a clip of 20 to 60 per day.

Every think tank, non-profit, trade association, and lobbyist in town has produced a set of policy recommendations for the incoming Obama administration. In an unprecedented effort to cultivate transparency, the transition team is posting all of these memos on its website. As of December 15, there were 356 groups listed, several of which submitted multiple documents.

Competition for the transition team's attention is obviously fierce, nowhere more so than in the field of foreign policy. Which brings me to the good news and the bad news.

The bad news is that I come bearing yet another policy memo for Team Obama. The good news is that my recommendations are the result of a yearlong series of meetings that convened 60 scientists, academics, members of Congress, senior congressional staffers, and representatives from advocacy groups, think tanks, and foundations to assess the priorities for the next administration on nuclear arms control and non-proliferation.

In other words, these recommendations are not just what I think. They are the consensus of many notable policy and political experts, an arms control brain trust. A list of participants is available with our report, which is now available online.

Here are the top three recommendations:

1. Provide a new direction on nuclear weapons policy that emphasizes "minimum deterrence," extend the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and signal intent to pursue negotiations with Russia on further reductions.

• Issue a statement explaining a new vision for nuclear weapons policy and guidance for the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review. The statement should include the intent to pursue nuclear weapons reductions and a reiteration that the only role for nuclear weapons is "minimum deterrence" - deterring the use of nuclear weapons against the United States or U.S. allies.
• Extend START I and begin bilateral negotiations with Russia on further permanent, legally-binding, and verifiable reductions toward a goal of 1,000 deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons per side or fewer. Send a special envoy to Russia or appoint a working group to signal U.S. intent to maintain verification provisions and move toward further reductions.

2. Announce intent to secure all vulnerable fissile material in four years as the best way to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. Accelerate and prioritize these efforts accordingly and appoint a senior official to coordinate threat reduction efforts.

3. Announce intent to seek ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and begin working to build the bipartisan support in the Senate needed for approval.

We all know that President Bush significantly weakened U.S. leadership on nuclear weapons and spurred increased proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. Specific Bush administration policies that contributed to this failure include withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; expansion of missile defense plans into Poland and the Czech Republic; efforts to develop three new types of nuclear weapons; emphasis on making nuclear weapons more usable; threatening nuclear weapons use against non-nuclear weapon states in violation of prior U.S. commitments; and repudiating key promises made at the 1995 and 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conferences.

Our full report explains how we believe Bush's failures can be rectified. While we hate to contribute to Washington's snowflake blizzard, the spread of nuclear weapons and materials is simply too grave of a threat to ignore. Strong American leadership is needed in order to meet current challenges from Iran, North Korea, and unsecured weapons and materials known as "loose nukes."

President Obama and the 111th Congress will have a historic opportunity to effectively address the threat of nuclear weapons and strengthen U.S. and international security starting on January 20, 2009. Help us spread the word that the time for action is now.

The younger and more internet-savvy members of our staff showed me a new video clip last week entitled "33 Minutes." It comes courtesy of the unabashed hawks at the right-wing Heritage Foundation. The title refers to the amount of time it would take an intercontinental ballistic missile or 'ICBM' to reach the United States. Apparently the clip is merely a preview of a longer movie set to be released in February 2009.

Watch it for yourself, but you might want to put the kids to bed first.

Kudos to Heritage for catching the typo they included in the YouTube version at 1:54 - "Balliatic"? - and correcting it on their website. Sadly they forgot to iron out other mistakes of a more substantive nature. I'll leave the mockery to others and stick to three main points.

First, Heritage commits the ultimate faux pas in national security analysis: It proposes a solution that doesn't achieve their primary objective. Robert Joseph, a committed arms racer and intellectual heir to John Bolton, says early on in the video that "my number one concern today is a terrorist with a nuclear weapon." A legitimate fear, to be sure, especially when you consider that the final report of the bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism predicted that such an attack will "more likely than not" occur somewhere in the world by 2013.

The problem, of course, is that missile defense won't stop nuclear terrorism. How exactly will missile defense interceptors in Europe stop a terrorist with a small nuclear explosive device from entering the United States through Canada? Or prevent a shielded nuclear device, invisible to cargo detectors, from being smuggled into a U.S. port aboard a ship? Missile defense, obviously, is useless against these kinds of terrorist attacks.

Second, Heritage is guilty of fear-mongering without supplying the appropriate facts and context. That is the height of irresponsibility. The video begins by stating that over 20 countries have a ballistic missile capability. Yet, as arms control expert Joseph Cirincione pointed out at a congressional hearing on missile defense earlier this year, nearly all countries that possess ballistic missiles today are allies of the United States and possess only short-range missiles that threaten their neighbors, not the American homeland.

Lt. Gen. Henry Obering raises the specter of the United States only having 33 minutes to respond if Iran or North Korea launches an ICBM at us. Unfortunately, this frightening scenario becomes not quite so scary when you remember that neither country currently possesses a missile proven to be capable of hitting the continental United States. Though U.S. intelligence assessments have concluded that North Korea and Iran could develop such an ICBM several years in the future, deploying an unproved and unworkable missile defense system is not the way to change these states' behavior in the meantime. Currently deployed long-range missile defense systems remain an answer in search of a problem.

Third, Heritage praises missile defense for things it can't yet do. The reason for this boosterism is simple: missile defense is a theology, not a technology, for many conservatives. Gen. Obering claims that missile defense technology is so advanced that "we now are able to hit a spot on the bullet with a bullet." Later in the video, however, Kim Holmes confesses that "we do not have enough capability right now to do what we need to do." Well, which is it guys? Does the system work or doesn't it?

In the past nine years, the ground-based midcourse missile defense system successful" test on December 5. They do not represent what might happen were a missile actually to be launched at the United States. That's why the Government Accountability Office concluded in February 2008 that tests completed to date "are developmental in nature and do not provide sufficient realism" to determine whether the system "is suitable and effective for battle." Our missile defense system still cannot neutralize a missile threat that employs even relatively simple decoys that could be developed by any country able to build complex, long-range, nuclear-tipped missiles.

Robert Joseph opens the video with a cheap shot at President-elect Barack Obama. "Hope is not a good foundation for a national security strategy," Joseph sneers. I'm sure Joseph would point to President Ronald Reagan, patron saint of the Heritage Foundation, as the model for a strong national leader.

What's funny is that in one of the most famous speeches of his administration, Reagan talked about something that offered "hope for our children in the 21st century" and "hope for the future" and "a vision of the future which offers hope." Know which speech it was?

It was Reagan's address to the nation introducing the Strategic Defense Initiative or 'Star Wars,' his flagship missile defense program.

Oops.

Diplomacy, deterrence, and containment have been and will continue to be far more effective than missile defense as protection against a ballistic missile threat to the United States. One should keep that in mind when the Heritage Foundation's movie accompanies a full court press for more money to field an unworkable missile defense system in 2009.

This statement was presented by Leonor Tomero, director for nuclear nonproliferation, at the Department of Energy’s December 9 hearing on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS).

STATEMENT TEXT

The alternatives assessed in detail under the PEIS do not meet the objectives of GNEP – namely the goals of contributing to solve the problem of nuclear waste and decreasing the risk of nuclear proliferation as it relates to nuclear energy – and do not take into account the costs and realistic time-frames of most alternatives while failing to include a detailed study of more promising alternatives.

Many of the alternatives assessed would likely exacerbate, not reduce, the proliferation risks of nuclear energy.

Reprocessing, which is considered in most alternatives discussed in the PEIS, increases the risk that bomb-grade material will fall into terrorist hands. By engaging in steps that remove many of the necessary barriers that prevent terrorists from acquiring material for a bomb and increasing the production of nuclear-weapons-usable material (or material that could be easily converted to pure plutonium), reprocessing increases the risk that this dangerous material will fall into the hands of terrorists. As long as the plutonium remains in spent fuel, it is extremely difficult to steal because of the intense radiation emitted by the fission products in the spent fuel.

France, the United Kingdom and Japan have accumulated over 192 metric tons of plutonium from commercial reprocessing (including foreign-owned plutonium), enough for 24,000 nuclear weapons. The Royal Academy of Sciences of the United Kingdom confirmed in 2007 its 1997 assessment that the plutonium should be disposed of safely given the growing risk of terrorism. As nuclear terrorism remains one of the gravest threat to U.S. security, the United States should pursue policies that will reduce the stocks of plutonium, rather than produce additional plutonium (or material that could be easily separated to yield nuclear weapons-usable plutonium, such as the U-Pu mix or the Pu-minor actinides mix).

Reprocessing weakens U.S. non-proliferation efforts, which is not addressed in the PEIS, and the Proliferation Assessment has not been released yet, despite promises that it would be released in the same time-frame as the PEIS.

Focus on reprocessing and fast reactor technology significantly undermines U.S. and international efforts to prevent the spread of reprocessing and uranium enrichment technologies to other countries. GNEP’s vision of supplier countries that would be allowed to reprocess has already encouraged other countries to seek this technology. In addition, the position that a handful of countries, including the United States, can engage in this process while all other countries should forego these technologies because of the risk that they could use them to produce material for nuclear weapons directly undermines decades of nuclear non-proliferation efforts. As an example, the United States successfully helped convince countries such as Brazil, Germany, South Korea and Taiwan not to reprocess. As a result, today, Japan is the only non-weapon state that reprocesses. Since 2006 when GNEP was announced, South Africa and South Korea have both expressed interest in acquiring reprocessing technology, and the United States has been cooperating with South Korea on these technologies for the past year pursuant to GNEP.

In addition, while the proposal to use CANDU reactors to burn the spent fuel from light-water reactors would not produce plutonium, it would promote the use of CANDU reactors which are generally considered less-proliferation-resistant than light-water reactors since CANDUs do not have to be shut down to be re-fueled and thus efforts to unload spent fuel rods for the purpose of reprocessing would be harder to detect and monitor.

The alternatives assessed in the PEIS do not appropriately assess the cost of the proposed alternatives.

A 1996 National Academy of Sciences report concluded that reprocessing and plutonium re-use would cost tax payers at least an additional $100 billion for waste disposal. The Department of Energy has not released any lifecycle cost estimate for reprocessing and plutonium re-use since a 1999 report that estimated the lifecycle cost of reprocessing and plutonium re-use in fast reactors at $280 billion. The economics of reprocessing do not justify a change from the current “once-through” fuel cycle practice.

GNEP envisions the deployment of dozens of fast reactors. These fast reactors are more expensive than the proliferation-resistant light water reactors that the United States and most countries with nuclear power currently use, and pose more safety risks to operate. The U.S. nuclear industry has not expressed willingness to share in the costs of, or make any investments in, reprocessing, thus the costs would be borne entirely by taxpayers and rate-payers.

The alternatives assessed in the PEIS do not contribute to solving the nuclear waste problem.

The alternatives that include the separation of materials through reprocessing – the re-use of some of the material in fast reactors and/or light-water reactors – do not provide a viable solution to the problem of nuclear waste and will create additional waste streams compared to the no-action alternative. The PEIS acknowledges that low-level waste will result from many of the alternatives proposed but does not propose where to store or dispose of this waste stream. Similarly, many of the proposed alternatives would separate the highly radioactive fission products Cesium and Strontium and propose to dispose of these fission products in a permanent geological repository or store them for 300 years (the PEIS does not provide a proposal of where these would be stored, though they would likely be stored at the reprocessing facility). Re-using plutonium in light-water reactors does not reduce the radioactivity of the waste compared to a once-through cycle (with no reprocessing).

In addition, the PEIS fails to consider the waste streams produced by reprocessing such as Iodine-131 and Iodine-133 and Iodine-129, which in the case of France are dumped into the North Sea. The promise that reprocessing and plutonium re-use in fast reactors will reduce the radiotoxicity of the nuclear waste is still an illusion as safe and economically-viable fast reactor technology is still decades away at best despite years of international research.

The PEIS considers for its 2010-2060 timeframe alternatives that are not yet available on a commercial scale.

Fast reactors and high-temperature gas cooled reactors still need significant research and development. In the case of fast reactors, most in the world have been shut down because of safety and operating problems, high costs and local opposition. Congress terminated plans to build the Clinch River fast breeder reactor in Tennessee in 1983 after costs increased to $8 billion, compared to the original projected costs of $400 million. However, several PEIS alternatives assume the deployment of dozens of these reactors (for example using 40% fast reactors).

Even the more proven technologies such as the available reprocessing technology have been failures. In 1972, the only operating reprocessing plant in the United States, located in West Valley, New York, was shut down after only six years of troubled operation in which it reprocessed the equivalent of only four months worth of the spent fuel currently produced by U.S. nuclear power plants. It left major environmental contamination, the commercial reprocessing part of which is costing over $5 billion to clean-up.

DOE plans for rapid deployment have been criticized. Both a 2007 National Academy of Sciences report and a 2008 Government Accountability Office report criticized the Department of Energy’s premature plans for reprocessing and fast reactors. In addition, a 2007 Keystone report – endorsed by representatives from the Nuclear Energy Institute and nuclear utilities including Exelon, Entergy, Southern Nuclear, GE Energy-Nuclear, Duke Energy and FPL – concluded that GNEP “is not a strategy for resolving either the radioactive waste problem or the weapons proliferation problem” and that “critical elements of the GNEP are unlikely to succeed.”

The PEIS dismissed and failed to consider seriously more promising alternatives.

By focusing on either technology that requires significant research and development or existing technology that does not reduce the radiotoxicity of nuclear waste but increases the cost, safety and proliferation risks of disposal, the PEIS dismissed more cost-effective, safer, more proliferation-resistant and less contaminating alternatives, such as the once-through fuel cycle without reprocessing and fast reactor research and development, interim dry-cask storage on-site and the development of renewable sources of energy. Several of these alternatives could be used immediately without further research and development.

On October 14, the World Health Organization (WHO) released its annual World Health Report. This year’s report, entitled “Primary Health Care – Now More Than Ever,” identifies major deficits and challenges facing health care systems worldwide.

The WHO asserts that health care today has become too narrowly focused on disease management, is unaffordable for much of the world’s population, and is inaccessible for many in the developing world due to a lack of services and infrastructure within health care systems. However, as WHO Director Dr. Margaret Chan states, “A world that is greatly out of balance in matters of health is neither stable nor secure.”

The report argues that social stability is threatened as “health care systems lose focus on providing fair access to care, their ability to invest in resources wisely, and their capacity to meet the needs of people everywhere.” These problems are particularly acute in developing nations; but even in the most developed nations, people living outside of major metropolitan areas are suffering from a lack of health care accessibility. Poverty also contributes to decreased access to health care as well, as individuals who lack adequate resources seek health care only when sick.

Rather than strengthening comprehensive primary and preventative health care, in the last two decades there has been a notable shift toward short-term curative and emergency medical care. Ironically, this increasing focus on treating specific diseases too often further diverts funding and resources away from the development of robust health care systems, including the basic infrastructure needed to ensure public health such as hospitals, services, and staff.

The WHO states that a return to primary health care must be adopted to remedy the challenges facing public health care today. A primary health care system, with its holistic approach, would revolve around preventing disease in addition to treating and curing ailments. Accordingly, the WHO stresses that public policies should emphasize building infrastructure, increasing access to health care, and restoring the public’s confidence in health care systems.

HEALTH CARE SYSTEM AND A BIOLOGICAL ATTACK?

How does this issue relate to the problem of biological weapons? Simply put, a health care system that lacks the necessary infrastructure to adequately treat patients cannot effectively resolve a public health crisis. Whether that crisis is in the form of HIV/AIDS, a flu pandemic, or the result of a deliberate biological attack, a robust health care infrastructure must be in place to effectively counter threats to public health.

Given the expanding nature of public health threats, efforts to strengthen public health systems should extend across the board to all government programs committed to the security and stability of global health. For example, the National Academy of Sciences recently argued that the Defense Department’s Biological Threat Reduction Program, which engages countries of the former Soviet Union, has been too narrowly focused on biological weapons agents and should give greater priority to building public health research, surveillance, and response capacity in order to address naturally occurring infectious diseases of concern to both the United States and partner nations.

Such an approach would not only help halt the spread of infectious diseases – the foundation of public health – but also would also provide a more effective means for engaging other nations in efforts to prevent and contain biological attacks.

The security agreement signed by the United States and Iraq and approved by the Iraqi parliament last week marks the beginning of the end of the American occupation.

It is about time. For more than six years, this war has undermined the American position in the world, trampled Iraqi sovereignty and caused over 4,000 American and 176 British combat deaths – not to mention tens or even hundreds of thousands of Iraqi casualties.

Robert McNamara's Vietnam war-era claim that we can see "the light at the end of the tunnel" now appears to actually be true in Iraq.

President-elect Barack Obama, in a December 1 press conference, agreed that the war is in its end-game. The US-Iraq agreement, Obama said, "points us in the right direction. It indicates we are now on a glide path to reduce our forces in Iraq."

The agreement mandates that "all US combat forces" withdraw from urban areas in Iraq by June 30, 2009, and that "all US forces" withdraw from the country by December 31, 2011. The agreed-to language upholds Iraq's "sovereign right" to demand the departure of US forces anytime and recognizes the United States' "sovereign right" to remove its forces earlier than the end of 2011.

This timetable is consistent with Obama's pledge, stated over and over during the election campaign, to remove all US combat troops within 16 months of taking office in January 2009.

Indeed, the agreement to remove all American forces by the end of 2011 goes beyond Obama's promises, as he has talked of leaving a residual force in Iraq indefinitely to train and equip Iraqi security forces, fight terrorists and protect remaining American personnel. Obama may well run up against an Iraqi desire to be rid of American troops once and for all.

When negotiations began more than a year ago, those opposed to the continuation of the war feared the worst. It would be, they thought, an attempt by President George Bush to tie the hands of his successor. Anti-Iraq war activists also believed the agreement was an effort to leave a permanent American presence in Iraq with the control of oil substantially in American hands.

However, Iraqi government officials, concerned with the appearance of ceding too much power to the Americans, forced many concessions from the Bush administration. Indeed, the agreement represents a stunning reversal for the Bush administration, which until now rejected any timeline for troop withdrawals and clearly saw Iraq as an outpost and demonstration of America's military power in the Middle East.

Instead, no matter how Iraq turns out in the end, this war will be marked by historians as a disaster in both conception and implementation.

The beginning of the end of the war does not mean that there will not be many hiccups along the way. While there are fewer casualties than before, there is little doubt that fighting may flare up again. There is still very little agreement on power sharing between the Shias, the Sunnis and the Kurds, and those groups may resume violent clashes in the future.

Moreover, the accord included a number of ambiguities that could grow into sore points. The two countries left vague the freedom of action for US soldiers, future security commitments and the protection of Iraqi assets.

And while the Iraqi parliament, and perhaps the Iraqi people through a future referendum, have been required to approve the agreement before it can go into affect, President Bush refused to submit the agreement for approval to the US Congress.

Still the agreement, combined with the coming to power of a new American president who opposed the war in the first place, means that American military involvement in Iraq is finally coming to an end.

The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation and Terrorism released its final report today: World at Risk. The Commission was created by HR 1, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, in order to “address the grave threat that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses to our country.” The panel was chaired by former Democratic Senator Bob Graham and former Republican Senator Jim Talent.

Leading experts from the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation issued reactions to the Commission’s findings.

LEONOR TOMERO, DIRECTOR FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

The report is an urgent call for action and effective leadership to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, which is one of the gravest threats to U.S. security. The report highlights the urgency for the new administration and Congress to take practical steps that will most effectively reduce the risk of biological and nuclear weapons-usable materials spreading and falling into terrorist hands.

This report is all the more important as several key recommendations, such as appointing a high-level official to coordinate U.S. efforts on WMD proliferation (recommended by the 9/11 Commission), have been mandated by Congress and ignored by the Bush administration.

The report also points to several new and timely recommendations such as declaring a moratorium on reprocessing for civilian purposes, stopping the use of bomb-grade uranium for civilian purposes, extending the verification provisions of the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (which is set to expire next year), limiting the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, and strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency’s capability to detect diversions of dual-use materials in a timely manner. It also calls for engaging other countries more deeply in these efforts as the United States will need international cooperation and buy-in to make these efforts effective.

While the report highlights the need to strengthen non-proliferation efforts and to revitalize the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by imposing automatic penalties for non-compliance and by expanding the capabilities and resources of the IAEA, the United States will likely have to make significant progress on promises it made pursuant to its Article VI NPT commitments. In this context, the report favors extending the key provisions of the START agreement.

It is likely the United States will have to begin negotiating further significant reductions and make good on other promises such as ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty if it seeks further buy-in and support from non-nuclear weapon states on making progress to limit the spread of nuclear weapons material and technologies.

The actions recommended in the report are achievable in the near- to medium-term; without them, the United States will continue to dangerously fall behind in the race to prevent nuclear terrorism.

ALAN PEARSON, DIRECTOR FOR BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONTROL

The Commission correctly argues that the United States has placed too little emphasis on preventing biological attacks and limiting the proliferation of biological weapons. The new administration and the next Congress should heed the Commission’s call for greater government oversight of research laboratories working with the most dangerous pathogens, the creation of an oversight system for high-risk research, and the renewal of U.S. global engagement, which is essential for effectively reducing biological threats.

As the report argues, the United States should devote much more effort to strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, improving infectious disease surveillance capabilities, and expanding cooperative threat reduction activities. The Commission also makes an intriguing proposal for a new initiative to bring together leading developed and developing nations to forge a global biosecurity strategy.

FOR MORE INFORMATION

The Future of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP): Next Steps
The Expanding Range of Biowarfare Threats
Understanding and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism
Fact Sheet on Strengthening Arms Control and Nonproliferation
Time to Name a Coordinator for WMD Proliferation

By Lt. Gen. Robert G. Gard Jr. (USA, Ret.) and Tom Andrews

The media obsession over who's in and who's out of consideration for the Obama Cabinet brings the admonition on the famous "War Room" wall of Bill Clinton's 1992 presidential campaign to mind: "It's the Economy Stupid!" Those of us eagerly awaiting relief from the debacle called the Bush administration should avoid getting swept up the in DC parlor game of who is getting what position in the new administration and focus instead on the fundamental changes we need the Obama administration to start making. In short, "It's the Policy Stupid!"

President Obama will begin his presidency with enormous good will from the American people and great hope from the world at large. It is imperative that he seize this opportunity by quickly moving his campaign pledges into bold and decisive action despite the opposition that surely awaits him.

Step one: End the US military occupation of Iraq. Immediately begin withdrawing US combat forces within sixteen months, clearly delineating the number and role of any remaining troops to limited non-combat roles such as providing security to the US embassy and training Iraqi security forces. Even before taking office, President-elect Obama's message of change has made a security pact with Iraq much more likely by assuring Iraqis that the United States will respect their sovereignty and pull our forces out. It has weakened Iranian opposition by increasing their confidence that the US will not be occupying permanent military bases on their neighbor's soil as a staging ground for attack

Step two: Change course in Afghanistan. Responding to the Bush administration's failure in Afghanistan by initiating an escalation of US combat troops could be the next step into a quagmire that would be a catastrophe for the United States, Obama's presidency, and the region. Changing course should include support for the Afghan government's outreach to insurgent forces, including elements of the Taliban willing to negotiate an end to armed conflict; a robust diplomatic effort that reaches out to key regional nations, including Iran and Pakistan; and a serious and sustained commitment of humanitarian aid and development assistance that can bring relief and hope to the beleaguered people of Afghanistan. Continued military commitment should be limited and predicated on a clear exit strategy that is linked to this comprehensive approach.

Step three: Engage Iran. President Obama should declare that seeking regime change in Iran is no longer the policy of the U.S. and initiate diplomatic contacts with the Iranian government immediately without preconditions.

Step four: Make a just and lasting peace in the Middle East a top priority by seriously arbitrating a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and capitalizing on the common interests of states in the region to prevent an implosion of Iraq and to establish stability.

Step five: Replenish the strength of our weakened military by cutting the number of troops that are put into harms way and striking unnecessary and obsolete military weapons from the defense budget. President Obama should reject calls for an increase in military spending and combat forces. Troop levels should be set not by reacting to the demands of militarizing our foreign policy under George W. Bush, but by the requirements of a new national security strategy. Additional levels of combat troops will be necessary only if the United States intends to launch yet more counter-insurgency campaigns by invasions and military occupations. The alternative is a national security policy that buries the "Bush Doctrine," respects international law, and restores America's place in the world as a source of inspiration and hope, not outrage and fear.

None of these steps will be easy. Hawks will echo Senator McCain's attacks during the presidential campaign that President Obama will be snatching defeat from the jaws of victory by changing course in Iraq. They will clamor for more troops in Afghanistan without any semblance of an exit strategy while rejecting meaningful diplomatic engagement with key regional players like Iran. And, they will relentlessly pressure Members of Congress from both parties to continue the gravy train of wasteful defense spending on obsolete and unnecessary weapons and equipment. President Obama and Members of Congress need to demand that, from now on, defense spending will be based on the national security interests of our nation and no longer on the political self-interest of politicians and the insatiable appetite of defense contractors.

Undoing the incalculable damage done by the Bush administration will require a fundamental reassessment of how to achieve genuine national security and setting a profoundly different course for national defense and foreign policy. The election of Barack Obama opens an extraordinary opportunity for our nation and the world. The stakes are too high to squander it.

Lt. General Robert G. Gard, Jr. is chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Tom Andrews, a former Member of Congress from the first Congressional District of Maine, is the National Director of Win Without War.

President-elect Barack Obama announced today that he will nominate Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) to be Secretary of State. Selecting a former rival for the most prestigious of cabinet positions has unleashed a torrent of media coverage, most of which has focused on grossly exaggerated disagreements during the presidential campaign and behind-the-scenes political maneuvering.

This reporting misses the point. As Lt. General Robert Gard, chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, wrote recently, “It’s not Hillary, it’s the policy stupid!” Reporters tend to exaggerate conflict because it makes for more interesting copy. The fact is, however, that when it comes to foreign policy, Obama and Clinton agree far more than they disagree.

The following comparison of Obama and Clinton's positions is based on several indicators: U.S. Senate voting records; national security platforms as laid out in articles and op-eds; and responses to queries in debates, public appearances, and questionnaires. Although campaign pledges and voting records do not always accurately translate into actual policy, they can provide important clues as to policy inclinations.

IRAQ

Hillary Clinton's position on Iraq has been complex. She joined Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) in supporting the 2002 authorization to go to war, and although she has refused to apologize for the vote, she later said, "If I knew then what I now know, I would not have voted that way." As a presidential candidate, Clinton promised, within 60 days of taking office, to begin withdrawing troops at the rate of one or two brigades a month, with the goal of getting most combat troops out by the end of 2009.

In 2002, when he was an Illinois state senator, Barack Obama opposed the war. After he was elected to the U.S. Senate, he and Clinton both voted against early proposals by Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI) and others to set a timetable for withdrawal; now both Obama and Clinton vote consistently in favor of establishing a timetable. Obama's plan for exiting Iraq would, like Clinton's, send home one or two combat brigades a month, with all combat troops out by the end of 2009. However, at an MSNBC debate in September 2007, neither Clinton nor Obama would guarantee that they would have all U.S. forces out of Iraq by the end of their first term. Both Obama and Clinton have opposed permanent bases in Iraq.

IRAN

President Bush has displayed unremitting hostility toward the radical regime dominating Iran, a country that U.S. intelligence sources report had previously been pursuing a nuclear weapons program. He branded Iran part of the "axis of evil" and promoted regime change as the preferred U.S. policy. With a few limited exceptions, the United States under Bush has refused to talk directly with Iran.

Obama and Clinton have delivered messages on Iran that were mixed. Obama promised to open a dialogue with Iran without preconditions to attempt to work out a solution. However, he called Iran "a threat to all of us" and suggested in March 2007 that the military option should remain on the table. At the same time, he said that it "would be a profound mistake for us to initiate a war with Iran" and condemned the administration's "saber-rattling" on Iran.

Clinton pledged to reach out immediately to Iran, saying, "you don't make peace with your friends. You have got to deal with ... people whose interests diverge from yours." At the same time, she indicated that she remains open to all options, including military ones. Clinton also declared: "We cannot, we should not, we must not permit Iran to build or acquire nuclear weapons." She voted for a controversial amendment offered by Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Lieberman that proposed labeling Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard a terrorist organization. Obama missed that vote but called the amendment a repeat of the mistakes that led to war in Iraq; however, he cosponsored an earlier bill declaring the Revolutionary Guard a terrorist organization.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In 2007, a bipartisan group of senior and former government officials called for moving toward a "world free of nuclear weapons." In their article by that name, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State George Shultz, former Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA), and former Secretary of Defense William Perry urged the United States to lead an international effort to rethink traditional deterrence, reduce nuclear weapon stockpiles, and take other steps toward the longer term goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Obama has been clear in his support of their effort. In response to a Council for a Livable World questionnaire, he promised: "As president, I will take the lead to work for a world in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be reduced and ultimately eliminated." Clinton said that "I endorse the vision set out by Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, Bill Perry, and George Shultz of a world without nuclear weapons and their idea of taking practical steps toward that vision."

New Nuclear Weapons: The Bush administration has put forward proposals to build a new generation of nuclear weapons; however, these plans might be seen as conflicting with U.S. efforts to restrain other states' nuclear ambitions.

Clinton voted against these programs all four times. She was clear in response to a Council for a Livable World questionnaire: "The Bush administration has dangerously put the cart before the horse, planning to rush ahead with new nuclear weapons without any considered assessment of what we need these weapons for or what the impact of building them would be on our effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons around the world." Obama, only in the Senate for the fourth vote, also opposed the new weapons. He was less categorical to the Council's queries, responding that he did not support "a premature decision to produce the [Reliable Replacement Warhead]."

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: One of the longest sought goals of the nuclear age has been a global ban on all nuclear test explosions as an important step to advance nuclear nonproliferation. In 1996, after 50 years of work, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was signed and opened for ratification. However, three years later, the Senate decisively rejected the treaty. Although the United States has not conducted a nuclear test explosion since 1992, the Bush administration has not put the treaty forward for a new vote.

Although neither Clinton nor Obama were in the Senate at the time of the 1999 vote, both have promised to make the test ban treaty a priority of their first term in office and pledged to work to rebuild bipartisan support for the treaty.

MISSILE DEFENSE

In 2001, the Bush administration withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and since then has moved swiftly to deploy national missile defense interceptors in Alaska and California. The latest fiscal budget request for 2009 is $12.3 billion for all forms of missile defense.

Obama has been critical of the Bush missile defense plans: "The Bush Administration has in the past exaggerated missile defense capabilities and rushed deployments for political purposes." Clinton's position has been more ambiguous. Of three key votes in 2004, she voted in effect for missile defense once and against it twice. However, she criticized President Bush's decision in 2001 to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and both she and Obama voted for an amendment offered by Sen. Carl Levin in 2005 (the last major vote on missile defense) while McCain missed the vote. She also criticized the Bush administration of "focusing obsessively on expensive and unproven missile defense technology." Neither Clinton nor Obama has indicated plans for missile defense.

Missile Defense Site in Europe: Obama has not been clear what he would do with the Bush proposal, but indicated that he would not allow the program "to divide 'new Europe' and 'old Europe.'" It is also unclear what Clinton's position is.

OTHER ISSUES IN BRIEF

Closing Guantanamo Bay prison: Clinton and Obama agree: Close the prison.

U.S.-India nuclear deal: Obama and Clinton voted for the U.S.-India nuclear deal in 2006, but they also voted for amendments to condition the deal on India ending military cooperation with Iran and a presidential certification that nuclear cooperation with India will not aid India in making more nuclear weapons.

Military forces:Obama and Clinton have called for expanding the size of our active duty military forces.

North Korea: Obama called for "sustained, direct, and aggressive diplomacy" with North Korea. Clinton called for "direct contact, engagement" with Pyongyang.

Nuclear nonproliferation: Clinton and Obama committed to securing all vulnerable nuclear weapons materials around the world within four years of taking office.

Iraqi political leaders meet in Baghdad to discuss the security agreement (November 23, 2008). Getty image.

CONCLUSIONS IN BRIEF

• The agreement represents a stunning reversal in policy for the Bush administration, which until now rejected any timeline for troop withdrawals.
• The Bush administration has fallen in line behind the policy of President-elect Barack Obama, who has proposed removing U.S. combat troops from Iraq within 16 months.
• While opponents of any long-term accord feared that President Bush was trying to tie the hands of the next president, the agreement eliminates that concern by giving President-elect Obama flexibility to change or cancel the agreement.
• The accord reinforces the views held by the majority of Iraqis and Americans that it is time for U.S. military forces to leave Iraq.
• The agreement bars permanent American bases in Iraq, prohibits the United States from using Iraqi territory to launch attacks against other nations, and bars any residual U.S. forces in Iraq beyond the end of 2011.
• Downsides include both the Bush administration's refusal to send the agreement to Congress for approval and various ambiguities in the text that could lead to future disputes.
• Overall, the agreement marks the beginning of the end for major U.S. military operations in Iraq, with the pace and specifics to be worked out once the Obama administration takes office.

BACKGROUND AND LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In November 2007, President George Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki signed a "Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship." The agreement, commonly referred to as a status of forces agreement or 'SOFA,' is slated to replace the UN Chapter VII mandate under which U.S. forces currently are operating in Iraq. The UN mandate expires at the end of the year and – without a replacement agreement – American forces will lack the legal authority to stay in Iraq.

Although a final draft of the SOFA was supposed to have been ready by July 2008, negotiations dragged on into the fall and a finalized agreement was not signed until mid-November. Presently, the agreement is awaiting approval by the Iraqi parliament, which is scheduled to vote on the accord on Wednesday, November 26.

While the majority of Iraqi parliamentarians support the pact and Iraqi citizens have taken to the streets to demonstrate in favor of it, lawmakers loyal to Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr oppose any agreement with the United States on principle and have been disrupting negotiations over the pact's approval. It remains to be seen whether or not the Iraqi parliament actually will hold a vote on the accord before the end of the week, when many Iraqi lawmakers are scheduled to take a religious holiday. To pass, the SOFA needs to get 138 votes out of 275 Iraqi lawmakers and also must be ratified by the Iraqi presidential council.

In the United States, political observers have noted the stunning reversal in policy that the SOFA represents for the Bush administration. For years President Bush insisted that any U.S. withdrawal from Iraq be based on conditions on the ground, not timelines imposed by Washington. By signing the SOFA, which mandates the withdrawal of all U.S. forces by the end of 2011, the Bush administration essentially falls in line behind the policy of President-elect Barack Obama, who has proposed the removal of American combat troops from Iraq within 16 months. President-elect Obama's transition office signaled that he wants Congress to have the opportunity to review the pact, though not necessarily to approve it.

While opponents of any long-term accord feared that President Bush was trying to tie the hands of the next president, the new SOFA eliminates that concern by giving President-elect Obama flexibility to change or cancel the agreement. Should Obama desire to change the SOFA's terms after taking office on January 20, 2009 – in order to remove American soldiers before the 2011 deadline, for example – he will be able to do so by either: 1) gaining the Iraqi government's consent in order to make changes; or 2) providing one year advance notice in order to cancel the agreement.

The SOFA reinforces the views held by the majority of Iraqis and Americans that it is time for U.S. military forces to leave Iraq. The accord also bars permanent American bases in Iraq, prohibits the United States from using Iraqi territory to launch attacks against other nations, and bars any residual U.S. forces in Iraq beyond the end of 2011. There are downsides to the agreement, of course, including the refusal of the Bush administration to send the SOFA to Congress for approval as well as various ambiguities in the text.

Overall, however, the agreement marks the beginning of the end for major U.S. military operations in Iraq, with the pace and specifics to be worked out once the Obama administration takes office.

WHAT DOES THE SOFA SAY?

THE GOOD

Timeline for withdrawal: Iraqis already have taken to calling the SOFA the "withdrawal agreement." Based on the text, this appears to be an accurate description. The SOFA mandates that "all U.S. combat forces" withdraw from urban areas in Iraq by June 30, 2009, and that "all U.S. forces" withdraw from the country by December 31, 2011. A previous draft would have allowed these withdrawal dates to be extended with both countries' approval, but that loophole was eliminated from the final version. The SOFA upholds Iraq's "sovereign right" to demand the departure of U.S. forces anytime and recognizes the United States' "sovereign right" to remove its forces earlier than the end of 2011.

Speculation already has begun about whether or not a follow-on agreement will need to be negotiated to govern a residual U.S. presence in Iraq after 2011. The SOFA states explicitly that "all U.S. forces" are to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. But Obama's plan currently calls for a residual U.S. force to remain in Iraq in order to conduct targeted counterterrorism operations, protect American personnel, and train and support Iraqi Security Forces. While impossible to predict at the present time, much will depend on how Iraqis view the reduced U.S. "overwatch" presence in Iraq and whether or not Iraqi political dynamics continue to reward leaders who oppose any continuing U.S. presence in the country (e.g. Moqtada Al Sadr's nationalist rhetoric has made him a popular figure on the Iraqi street).

Compensation for Iraqis: The SOFA states that while both countries waive their right to request compensation for injury or death occurring during official U.S. combat duties, the United States will continue its pattern of paying "fair and reasonable compensation" for third party claims of negligence or malfeasance by American soldiers and civilians performing both official and non-combat duties.

No permanent bases: The SOFA reiterates that Iraq owns all of the agreed upon buildings and installations used by the United States and that upon American withdrawal, these facilities and their predetermined inventories will be returned to the Iraqi government. Moreover, the text states that the United States is "not permitted to use Iraqi land, water, and airspace as a route or launching pad for attacks against other countries." In a likely attempt to bolster perceptions of Iraqi sovereignty, the agreement transfers "complete responsibility" for the Green Zone to the Iraqi government effective January 1, 2009. American embassy personnel already plan to move to a new embassy compound before the Iraqis take over responsibility for the Green Zone in 2009.

THE BAD

Confused chain of command: The SOFA creates the Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee (JMOCC), composed of representatives from both countries, to supervise U.S.-Iraqi military activities. Since the pact states clearly that all military operations must be "conducted with the approval of the government of Iraq," scenarios may develop where the freedom of action for U.S. armed forces is curtailed. This could be problematic; for example, what if U.S. forces receive actionable intelligence about a top Al Qaeda leader but have to wait for approval from the JMOCC before launching a rapid strike? The terrorist leader easily could slip away while military bureaucrats wait for approval. Some U.S. military officers already are speculating that they will need to obtain arrest warrants before detaining Iraqi suspects or searching homes.

In her testimony before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on November 19, University of California Berkeley law professor Oona Hathaway argued that the SOFA text appears to allow American commanders in the field to act without advance consent from the JMOCC only in cases of self defense. While this arrangement previously has existed when American soldiers were operating under foreign command as part of peacekeeping contingents, these arrangements were authorized by treaties which first gained approval from majorities in both houses of Congress or two-thirds of the Senate. By placing U.S. forces under partial foreign command, Hathway concludes, the JMOCC adds a stipulation to the SOFA that necessitates congressional approval.

Overextending executive power: Some believe the agreement in its current form extends President Bush's executive authority beyond lawful limits. For example, Professor Hathaway concluded that the agreement "undermines the constitutional powers of President-elect Obama." Because any request to alter the SOFA's withdrawal schedule must be agreed to by both countries and cancellation of the agreement requires one year advance written notice, Hathaway asserts that President-elect Obama may be bound to continue abiding by the agreement for a full year even if he decides the SOFA is no longer in the best interests of the United States. This potential handcuffing, in Hathaway's view, is "unprecedented and...unconstitutional in the absence of congressional authority." Perhaps as a reaction to this broad exercise of executive authority, some Democrats hinted that the Senate might hold a (non-binding) vote on the SOFA in 2009.

Vague security commitment: The SOFA contains ambiguous language on security commitments similar to provisions included in the original November 2007 draft. The pact commits the United States to providing diplomatic, economic, or military support to deter "external or internal danger...against Iraq or an aggression upon...its sovereignty, its political stability, the unity of its land, water, and airspace...[and] its democratic system or its elected establishments." Potential threats listed in the text include Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, outlaw groups, and remnants of the former regime.

Henry Kissinger once said that the problem with Europe was the lack of a single telephone number one could call to get Europe's policy. The same can be said of Iraq. Who exactly - Sunni, Shiite, or Kurd - determines Iraq's national interests? Iraq's competing sectarian factions, which sometimes lack a clear sense of nationalism, make it extremely difficult to asses what exactly constitutes an "external or internal danger." The vague language in the SOFA raises the specter of Iraqi leaders trying to use U.S. armed forces to advance their own sectarian interests. For example, Iraqi Kurds might argue that the United States is required to confront Turkey over its military actions against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in northern Iraq. One potential threat mentioned in the SOFA – "remnants of the former regime" – specifically raises concerns about the Shiite-dominated central government demanding American help to purge Sunni Baathists formerly loyal to Saddam Hussein.

If the elected Iraqi government was forced out by violence, the vague security commitment in the SOFA might be interpreted as requiring the United States to intervene to restore the elected government or to oust a government – even a stable government – that came to power through undemocratic means. Does the United States really want to be legally obligated to choose sides in an Iraqi civil war?

The SOFA language also might require the United States to crack down on activists in Iraq who the central government designate a threat but whose activities or political ideology might not necessarily conflict with U.S. interests. This might mean that the United States could be compelled to curtail activities in Iraq that represent core U.S. values such as promoting human rights, improving government transparency, and building democratic institutions.

Finally, the SOFA cements the U.S. commitment to "supplying and arming Iraqi Security Forces." While providing Iraqi Security Forces with the equipment they need to achieve their objectives will help increase Iraqi soldiers' confidence and effectiveness as the United States begins commencing troop withdrawals, Iraqi oversight of military equipment coming into the country must be bolstered. Baghdad and Washington are in the middle of a major effort to modernize the Iraqi military. The United States has completed approximately $20 billion in Foreign Military Sales agreements with Iraq since 2005. According to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction's July 2008 report, the United States also provided $17.9 billion in military-related aid – separate from Foreign Military Sales – since 2005 through the Iraq Security Forces Fund. If weapons are channeled toward dangerous insurgents and away from Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi soldiers will lose legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people and the security environment in Iraq could take another perilous turn toward sectarian bloodletting.

THE UGLY

Jurisdiction: Legal jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers was probably the most contentious issue during SOFA negotiations. This contentiousness is reflected in the final text. The agreement establishes that the United States has primary jurisdiction over American soldiers and civilians both inside U.S. installations and when they are on-duty outside of these installations. On the other hand, Iraq has primary legal jurisdiction over off-duty soldiers and civilians who commit "major and premeditated crimes" outside of U.S. installations. These major crimes will need to be defined by a joint committee and the United States retains the right to determine whether or not its personnel were on- or off-duty. Iraq also maintains primary legal jurisdiction over contractors (and their employees) that have contracts with the United States.

The SOFA goes to great lengths to ensure that Americans subject to Iraqi jurisdiction will be afforded the legal rights, procedures, and guarantees consistent with American and Iraqi law. In an underdeveloped Iraqi legal system, however, the protection and definition of these rights may be dubious at best. In a reflection of the complicated legal matters covered in the SOFA, the agreement requires both parties to review its jurisdictional provisions every six months. At that time, changes desired by either country can be instituted as long as both sides agree.

No protection for Iraqi assets: The SOFA does not contain language protecting Iraqi financial assets from seizure as part of legal claims against the former government of Saddam Hussein. This protection, which is currently included in both the UN mandate and an executive order signed by President Bush, allows the Iraqi government to move its assets – which come largely from oil revenues – into international banks without fear of having courts seize the funds to settle legal judgments. A number of American and Iraqi officials have said that an agreement protecting Iraqi assets will have to be negotiated separately from the SOFA.