On February 1, 2010 the Obama Administration released details of its proposed Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 defense budget. Not including funding for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan or the nuclear weapons related activities of the Department of Energy (DoE), the Administration is seeking $549 billion for the Department of Defense (DoD). In addition, the Administration has requested $159 billion for “Overseas Contingency Operations” to fund the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and $26 billion for nuclear weapons and other defense related funding.

The Pentagon's budget has increased dramatically since 2001. In inflation-adjusted dollars, the total defense budget has grown from $432 billion in FY01 to $720 billion in FY11, a real increase of approximately 67 percent. The Pentagon’s base budget, which excludes war and nuclear weapons funding, has also grown steadily over the last decade, increasing from $390 billion in FY01 to $540 billion in FY11, a real increase of 38 percent.

Budget Authority for National Defense, FY 2001-2011
(in billions of constant FY10 dollars)

Source: GAO, Overseas Contingency Operations: Funding and Cost Reporting for the Department of Defense, and FY 2011 President’s Budget documents.

Budget Authority for National Defense, FY 2001-2011
(in billions of constant FY10 dollars)

Source: GAO, Overseas Contingency Operations: Funding and Cost Reporting for the Department of Defense, and FY 2011 President’s Budget documents.

Published on the Nukes of Hazard Blog on March 4, 2010

It was reported last week that China is looking into allegations that it may have been involved in aiding a North Korean arms shipment bound for the Republic of Congo.  The shipment, which contained North Korean parts for Congo’s fleet of vintage T-54/T-55 tanks, was intercepted by South Africa in November 2009 and reported to the U.N Security Council this week.

South Africa was authorized to inspect and seize the cargo, first discovered by the French vessel owners who were shipping it, under the auspices of U.N Security Council Resolution 1874, which prohibits the DPRK from importing and exporting all military hardware, including parts.  The fact that the cargo was loaded onto the French ship at the port city of Dalian in China is notable.  Indeed, it seems that the North Korean cargo was brought into Dalian right under the nose of Chinese customs officials, who one might assume to be more vigilant of exports from the DPRK. It turns out that assumption is not entirely accurate.

Having taken a train from Beijing to Pyonyang last summer, news of sanctioned cargo passing unmolested through China came as little surprise to me. As a ‘Non-Proliferation’ MA candidate boarding the North Korean carriages being hauled to the border by a domestic Chinese train, I was astonished by the sheer amount of cargo headed for Pyonyang on what was ostensibly a passenger service.

Of perhaps thirty North Korean cabins (each designed to sleep four people), a good twenty were full of goods. In these cabins the goods consisted mainly of large boxes, covered with strongly attached tarps that obscured their contents completely.

Other cabins were full of what one could describe only as ‘luxury’ consumer goods; DVD players, flat screen TVs, trouser presses, and even in one case, a huge (a few feet high) presentation brandy glass. Even the corridors and vestibule areas (see my picture above) were rammed full of these boxes, some of which were also stacked amongst passengers in their own cabins.

When the train arrived at the border city of Dandong, Chinese customs officials boarded the North Korean cars to check our passports, visas, and bags. Although they did speak to the North Korean guards for a few minutes, they soon disembarked our part of the train. No attempt was made to inspect the cargo of mysterious boxes I mentioned, nor were any concerns raised about the many openly visible ‘luxury goods’ being transported. This was presumably excusable because China, unlike other countries, has never actually defined what it considers as ‘luxury goods’ for North Korea. Luxury goods are banned from being exported to the DPRK under UN Resolutions 1718 and 1874 because of the suspicion that they are for and used solely by the ruling elite.

Although my experience relates to Chinese customs apathy over North Korea’s imports, together with South Africa’s recent allegations, it is probably the case that exports from the DPRK are being waived through China in a similar way. This notion is backed up by a shipping company source in Dalian (referenced in the Wall Street Journal) who claims that Chinese customs officials there rarely inspect North Korean goods arriving for trans-shipment on their way to a third country. China’s official position is that inspecting North Korean cargo is both “complicated” and “sensitive,” and that “under no circumstances should there be the use of force or the threat of force” in implementing the sanctions in Resolution 1874.

The China-DPRK relationship has often been likened to that of the ‘teeth and lips’, following the Chinese saying that when the lips are gone, the teeth feel sensitive.  This is the nub of why China remains reluctant to take its sanctions obligations to the letter.

First, by supporting North Korea, China ensures a friendly dictatorship on its border, and thus, a buffer zone against a potentially destabilizing democratic South Korea. Beijing also has to think of its own people living in the border area, many of whom are reliant on China’s ever increasing interconnectedness with North Korea. Furthermore by keeping alive the regime in Pyonyang, China avoids having to deal with the millions of refugees that could flow across its border in the event the North Korean regime collapses. Turning a blind eye to imports and exports from North Korea can therefore be seen to suit these Chinese policy objectives.

With the news from South Africa, the total number of sanctions violation cases being investigated by the Security Council since the implementation of Resolution 1874 now stands at four. The others involve the shipment of chemical suits to Syria, Thailand’s interdiction of arms allegedly en route to Iran, and Italy’s seizure of two luxury yachts destined for North Korea. But it’s unlikely that these four cases represent the only North Korean efforts to flout sanctions.

Indeed, given North Korea’s meek GDP of $27 billion, it is doubtful that Pyonyang would continue risking the seizure of highly valuable assets unless a clear majority of these were being traded successfully. It’s probably safe to assume that not every shipment of proscribed goods is being interdicted, and that many more may be leaving and entering North Korean territory undetected – with China’s tacit support.

If it is true that North Korea’s WMD programs are being funded principally from illicit arms sales, then it is imperative that China take its sanctions obligations more seriously. Whether this duty will ever be compatible with China’s goal of maintaining North Korean regime stability is, however, another question.

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Greg Mello's recent Bulletin article "The Obama Disarmament Paradox" distorts the Obama administration's nuclear agenda by making unjustified assumptions that discredit President Barack Obama's historic commitment to seek a nuclear-weapon-free world. Obama has committed to such a goal several times--both before and after his election in November 2008. But Mello calls that a "vague aspiration" rather than a commitment. Yet the evidence he provides to support his assertion isn't persuasive.

In fact, the president has advocated for numerous initiatives in a comprehensive nonproliferation program. These include winning U.N. Security Council endorsement for a nuclear-weapon-free world; negotiating a new arms reduction treaty with Russia, which Obama considers an interim agreement toward further reductions; preparing a Nuclear Posture Review consistent with reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy; pledging to secure all loose nuclear materials over a four-year period; and taking an active role at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.

As President Obama stated during his seminal Prague speech on nuclear disarmament, achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world is a long-term goal that might not be achievable in his lifetime, but that doesn't minimize the necessity of taking interim steps to reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation.

Mello sees Obama's requested increase in the fiscal year 2011 budget for stockpile stewardship and the construction of new facilities at the nuclear laboratories as a commitment to the production of new nuclear weapons. Yet the administration has made clear that there are no such plans underfoot; the 2011 budget request states unequivocally that "new weapons systems will not be built." As such, the president's requested increase in nuclear expenditures should be viewed in the context of seeking ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and further nuclear weapon reductions.

Testing...

BACKGROUND

The Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act mandated the U.S. Department of Defense to undertake a Nuclear Posture Review, a comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear weapons strategy and policy for the next five to ten years. The review, which began in the Spring of 2009, was originally scheduled to be submitted to Congress in December 2009, but it has been delayed until March or April 2010.

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review marks the third such comprehensive study since the end of the Cold War. The first was completed by the Clinton administration in 1994 and the second by the George W. Bush administration in 2002. While the 1994 and 2002 reviews were classified, the current study will produce an unclassified report as one of its products.

PURPOSE

President Obama’s April 5, 2009, speech in Prague presenting a vision of a world without nuclear weapons provides the backdrop for the NPR. The review will attempt to strike a balance between the President’s pledge to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons and his commitment to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile so long as nuclear weapons exist.

Specifically, the review will weigh in on such important issues as:

• the role and purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal

• the appropriate number, types, and composition of U.S. nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles (i.e. the missiles and bombers used to deliver nuclear warheads to their targets) necessary to meet the designated role and purpose

• the resources and facilities required to maintain U.S. nuclear arsenal

• preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and know-how to additional states and terrorists

SIGNIFICANCE

The Nuclear Posture Review will influence the implementation of the President’s agenda to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons laid out in Prague. This agenda includes pursuit of a follow-on agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expired on December 5, 2009, ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), safeguarding and eliminating all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within four year, a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) to ban the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes, and a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010.

Since ratification of the START follow-on agreement seems unlikely in the first half of 2010, the Nuclear Posture Review will be one of the – if not the – principal completed U.S. actions before the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference begins in May 2010. A review that does not depart from the status quo could contribute to a perception among the non-nuclear weapon states that the nuclear weapon states are not living up to the basic bargain of the treaty. This could in turn make the non-nuclear weapons states reluctant to approve further nonproliferation measures, such as enhanced inspection protocols or support for tougher measures against Iran and North Korea.

Though not yet fully completed, some of the early results of the review have already had an impact on U.S. nuclear policy and planning. Some examples include:

• The early work on the review established the direction of the START follow-on negotiations with Russia. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 9, 2009, General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said: “We prioritized in the Nuclear Posture Review…the activities and the analysis that would be necessary to support the timelines associated with…the follow-on START negotiations.”

• The review has delivered an early verdict on the President’s pledge in Prague to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile so long as nuclear weapons exist. Deputy Secretary of Energy Dan Poneman stated in a February 17, 2010 speech that “the early analysis from the Nuclear Posture Review concluded that providing that assurance, especially at lower numbers of nuclear weapons, will require increased investments to strengthen an aging physical infrastructure and to sustain scientific and technical talent at our nation’s national security laboratories.” The Obama administration’s Fiscal Year 2011 budget request, which was released on February 1, 2010, devotes $7 billion for maintaining the U.S. nuclear stockpile and complex, and for related science and technology programs, an increase of $600 million over what Congress appropriated last year.

Other tentative results of the review have begun to emerge:

• In keeping with President Obama’s elevation of nuclear terrorism as the principal threat to U.S. national security, the review seems ready to make the prevention of nuclear terrorism a goal equal to the traditional objectives of preventing both state-led nuclear weapon development and usage.

• The review appears poised to call for the retirement of the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear, a sea-launched cruise missile that during the Cold War was deployed on some U.S. attack submarines but has remained in storage at military bases on the U.S. mainland since the early 1990s.

PREPARATION

According to a June 2009 Department of Defense terms of reference fact sheet, the review was being conducted simultaneously with the Quadrennial Defense Review (released on February 1, 2010), the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (released on February 1, 2010), the Space Policy Review, the START-follow on negotiations, and preparations for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

The Nuclear Posture Review has been led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy and Secretary of State. Primary responsibility has resided with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Cartwright.

The process has embraced a ‘whole of government’ approach, meaning that the Department of Defense has consulted with other government departments and agencies, Congressional committees, and even nuclear scholars from think tanks, advocacy organizations, and academia. The results of the review will guide nuclear policy across the entire U.S. foreign policy making apparatus.

KEY CHALLENGES

Recent reports have indicated that there was a lack of consensus among the participants in the review process on the future direction of U.S. nuclear policy. The release of the review was delayed from December 2009 to February 2010 and then again to some time in March or April 2010 because many of the key issues had yet to be resolved or approved.

Some of these issues have included:

The role and purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal

Since the end of the Cold War the United States has maintained a policy of “calculated ambiguity” regarding when it might use nuclear weapons. According to this policy, nuclear weapons are necessary to “provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and largescale conventional military force.”

At issue is whether the U.S. should retain the current policy of calculated ambiguity or revise it in favor of something that is more in keeping with the objectives laid out by President Obama in Prague. One popular formulation is that the review should state that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attacks on the U.S. and its allies. Some argue that the U.S. should be even more explicit and declare that the U.S. will never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack.

The appropriate number of nuclear weapons

As noted above, the Nuclear Posture Review has been closely coordinated with the START follow-on negotiations to inform the U.S. negotiating position. The early results of the review were reflected in the “Joint Understanding for the START Follow-On Treaty” agreed to by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in Moscow in July 2009. The Joint Understanding stated that the START follow-on agreement will limit the U.S. and Russia to 1,500-1,675 operationally deployed strategic warheads and 500-1,100 strategic delivery vehicles.

At issue is whether the U.S. can undertake even more significant reductions with Russia in the future. One view is that if the U.S. were to limit the purpose of nuclear weapons to deterring nuclear attacks on the U.S. and its allies, it could reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal far below the levels outlined in the Joint Understanding. Others argue that such dramatic reductions could undermine the confidence of U.S. allies in the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, thereby encouraging them to develop their own nuclear arsenals, and invite peer competition from smaller nuclear powers such as China.

Related to the total number of U.S. nuclear weapons is the number of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. It is estimated that the U.S. deploys approximately 200 B61 gravity bombs at six bases in Italy, Turkey, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands.

The review could call for the beginning of consultations with NATO to ultimately withdraw – or at the very least consolidate – the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. A passage in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review stated that the Nuclear Posture Review will outline “new, tailored, regional deterrence architectures” which will “make possible a reduced role for nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.” On February 19, 2010, a spokesperson for the Belgian Prime Minister proclaimed that Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway intend to demand within NATO “that nuclear arms on European soil belonging to other NATO member states are removed.” According to one commentator, “presumably, some coordination with Washington has taken place [regarding the statement].”

Maintaining U.S. nuclear warheads

Since announcing a moratorium on nuclear testing in 1992, the U.S. has opted to maintain its existing arsenal of nuclear warheads through stockpile stewardship and life extension (also known as refurbishment). This has involved replacing aging, mostly non-nuclear components with parts that hew as closely as possible to the original design specifications. Some claim that selective parts replacement cannot extend the life of the existing arsenal indefinitely and that new warhead designs may be necessary to achieve President Obama’s pledge to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile so long as nuclear weapons exist.

However, a September 2009 report by the JASON defense advisory group concluded that “lifetimes of today’s nuclear warheads could be extended for decades, with no anticipated loss in confidence.” The bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States noted in its final report that existing life extension programs and new warhead designs represent opposite ends of a spectrum of options to maintain the arsenal. Others argue that new warhead designs could undermine U.S. nonproliferation objectives by encouraging other states to build new and more advanced nuclear arsenals.

In September 2009 Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher stated that the Nuclear Posture Review would not revive the now defunct Reliable Replacement Warhead program. Yet some observers point out that the Nuclear Posture Review could recommend making extensive changes to warheads – or even new warhead designs – under the auspices of the newly created Stockpile Management Program.

CONCLUSION

The Nuclear Posture Review’s recommendations will likely echo the many different voices that contributed to the review process. If the 2010 NPR does attempt to please all of its many authors, it will likely fall well short of President Obama’s transformational vision.

Not only will the Nuclear Posture Review determine U.S. nuclear weapons policy for the next decade, but it could also influence the attitudes of other states toward nuclear weapons. Reports indicate that the White House has instructed the Pentagon to present the President with options that reflect the transformational agenda he laid out in Prague. Continued Presidential involvement and attention will be required to ensure that the NPR does not merely perpetuate the status quo.

Isaacs (of course) affirmed this statement, while Springs negated it.

Introductions

John Isaacs started by lauding Baker Spring’s now twenty-year contribution to work at the Heritage Foundation. He suggested in light of recent snow storms, a new slogan that he would try to get Baker Spring to endorse: “more snow plows, fewer nukes” makes sensible policy in Washington, DC today.

Given the existence of 23,000 nuclear weapons worldwide, over 90% of them possessed by the U.S. and Russia, Isaacs argued that the world stands at the brink of a proliferation tipping point. He cited the bipartisan consensus – including statesmen Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn, and former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger – for verifiable nuclear weapons reductions, a critical component of which is the successor to the START agreement, to prevent the spread or theft of the weapons. Isaacs also identified that nuclear weapons have no role to play in the war against terrorism or in areas of conflict where the U.S. is currently engaged, like Iraq and Afghanistan.

In his opening remarks, Baker Spring pointed out that over the past decade, nuclear issues have not been drawing the attention they deserve. He suggested that the important question about nuclear reductions should not be over the plausibility of further reductions, but rather over the timing of when those reductions should take place. He is not convinced that the pieces have been correctly put in place for the U.S. to undertake nuclear reductions within the appropriate strategic framework.

Spring agreed with Isaacs that the world is no longer shaped by the bipolar system of the Cold War, but said that is precisely why the U.S. should not make reductions in its arsenal. He argued that circumstances now require a nuclear posture that is geared towards stability. As nuclear proliferation is likely to increase, Baker suggested a future of nuclear multi-polarity may be possible. In today’s environment of nuclear multi-polarity, he argued that maintenance of the current U.S. arsenal and development of robust missile defenses would help to stabilize the international environment and prevent conflict.

Highlights from Q&A

Q: START has already expired. Does Baker want a new treaty or not?
Baker: The Moscow Treaty (commonly referred to as SORT) is still in effect, and verification elements should be added to it. The overall momentum has been for warhead numbers to come down, and there is no need to pursue the goal any more aggressively.

Q: Is there any circumstance in which Isaacs believes nuclear weapons should be used?
Isaacs: Nuclear weapons should only be used to deter nuclear attacks on the United States.Baker: Isn’t the deterrent then merely a “transparent bluff”?Isaacs: Whatever you call it, it’s been a very successful bluff since 1945.

Q: How can the U.S. keep a strong deterrent while making reductions?
Isaacs: President Obama has committed significant resources to ensure U.S. nuclear weapons are kept safe and effective. The independent scientific advisory group, JASON, has confirmed that U.S. nuclear weapons are safe, effective, and as useful as ever. We will continue to have the “most powerful nuclear force in the world.” I expect no one would want to trade our arsenal for Russia or China’s.

Conclusions

Baker summarized by saying he thought that it is not a good time to think about reductions now, not under current circumstances and under the current stated policies of the Obama administration, and not in the foreseeable future. He said that to be effective, nuclear weapons have to have political and military utility. Current force levels are essential for U.S. nuclear weapons to protect the U.S. and its allies. Too few people are thinking about these issues, and it would be a “fool’s errand” to reduce the arsenals at this point.

In concluding his remarks, Isaacs reiterated the new bipartisan consensus that during the Cold War, both the US and Russia developed far more nuclear weapons than they needed. He said that the “studies” Baker alluded to [that justified the maintenance of massive nuclear arsenals] smack of war games that justify huge, unnecessary expenditures on nuclear weapons and could result in the end of the human race. That is why there is now agreement among military leaders and policymakers to reduce nuclear arsenals. In the post 9/11 world, we can safely and securely reduce nuclear arsenals.

_____________________________

For video and audio of this debate, visit PONI’s website.

For more on the Center's work in support of a new agreement to reduce Russian and American nuclear weapons arsenals, click here to visit our START Resource Center.

For Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, which begins on October 1, 2010, the ObamaAdministration has requested a base budget of $548.9 billion for the Department of Defense (DoD). This is $18 billion, or 3.4 percent, above the appropriated Fiscal Year 2010 base budget of $531 billion.

In addition, the Administration has requested $159.3 billion for “OverseasContingency Operations,” to fight the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

This brings the Fiscal Year 2011 defense budget request to a total of $708.3 billion.

Further, the Administration has requested an additional $33 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations for Fiscal Year 2010. Including this $33 billion, total appropriated Pentagon spending for Fiscal Year 2010 will equal approximately $693.4 billion, a 4.1 percent increase over Fiscal Year 2009. This total brings us to a 2.1 percent increase in Fiscal Year 2011.

In real terms, this amounts to a $9 billion, or 1.3 percent, increase over Fiscal Year 2010.

These numbers do not include nuclear weapons related spending in the Department of Energy (DoE) or other defense related funding.

In addition to an initial $708 billion, the Administration has requested $18 billionfor nuclear weapons activities at Department of Energy and $7 billion for additional non-Pentagon defense related activities. This brings total non-Pentagon defense related spending (053/054) to $25 billion, a $2 billion increase over Fiscal Year 2010.

Click here for the full analysis of the FY 2011 request.

On January 28, 2010 at a Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation briefing for Senate staffers that was moderated by Center Chairman Lt. General Robert Gard (USA, Ret.), Dr. Richard Garwin discussed the reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons and options to ensure that these weapons remain safe and secure, and provided insight into what “modernization” is necessary. In this context, he detailed the findings of the JASON independent scientific advisory group report on the status of U.S. efforts to maintain the U.S. nuclear arsenal that concluded “Lifetimes of today’s nuclear warheads could be extended for decades, with no anticipated loss in confidence, by using approaches similar to those employed in LEPs [Life Extension Programs] to date.”

The Administration is currently evaluating the requirements necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the context of the Nuclear Posture Review, an assessment of U.S. nuclear strategy, policy, and forces. The Review is scheduled to be completed by March 1. In addition, the FY2010 Defense Authorization Act requires that when the President submits the START follow-on treaty to Congress he must also submit a plan to enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, modernize the nuclear weapons complex, and maintain the delivery vehicles (i.e. bombers, subs, and missiles).

Dr. Richard Garwin is an IBM fellow emeritus at the IBM Research Center, Yorktown Heights, New York; adjunct professor of physics at Columbia University; and a longtime consultant to the U.S. government on nuclear weapons and military technology. He was one of the principal designers of America’s first hydrogen bomb. He is also a member of the JASON scientific advisory group. He has published more than 500 papers and been granted 45 U.S. patents. He is a recipient of the National Medal of Science and the Enrico Fermi Award. He received a B.S. in Physics from Case Institute of Technology, Cleveland, in 1947, and a Ph.D. in Physics from the University of Chicago in 1949.

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The Graham-Talent WMD Commission asserted again last week that a bioterrorism attack that "will fundamentally change the character of life for the world's democracies" is highly likely to occur within the next four years. The commission argues that the United States must urgently expand its efforts to develop vaccines and other medical countermeasures against potential bioterrorism agents.

We disagree with the commission on both points. It exaggerates the bioterrorist threat and proposes solutions that won't produce the comprehensive approach needed to strengthen public health security.

The bioterrorist threat must be kept in perspective. Although many fictional "tabletop" scenarios and exercises have predicted bioterrorism catastrophes, these scenarios often have used unrealistic values for critical disease parameters and have routinely ignored the organizational and technical difficulties that terrorists would have in organizing, and successfully carrying out, a bioweapons attack. The history of both state-operated bioweapons programs and unsuccessful terrorist attempts to develop and use such weapons (e.g., the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo) have demonstrated, again and again, the significant difficulties that confront making and disseminating a biological weapon. The 2001 anthrax letter attacks, which were seen as validating the catastrophic scenarios, appear to have been executed with anthrax developed in a U.S. biodefense laboratory with capabilities vastly superior in scale and quality to anything a terrorist could achieve.

Advances in the life sciences may gradually put bioweapon capabilities closer within terrorist reach, but scientific and technological progress alone doesn't warrant exaggeration of the bioterrorist threat. Rather than basing policy on worst-case scenarios, the United States should develop and conduct more plausible, sophisticated threat assessments that take into account the complex set of political, social, and technical factors that would affect bioweapons development and use.

Whether you are reading this article in Tampa or Tucson, Los Angeles or Long Island, one thing is for certain: It’s six minutes to midnight.

While this may not be the normal mode of timekeeping for your dinner plans, it’s true for the “Doomsday Clock,” which figuratively marks the time remaining until the end of the world, due to a nuclear holocaust or an overheated planet. Drawing particular attention to progress made on nuclear weapons issues, a group of prominent scientists—including 19 Nobel laureates—decided on January 14 to move the clock’s minute-hand farther from midnight, from 11:55 p.m. to 11:54 p.m.

What seems like a fleeting amount of time when discussing daily routines is actually quite a significant move for the clock. Created in 1947, its hands have been moved just 19 times in 62 years.

So why the recent move?

In turning back the clock, the scientists recognized the significant progress made in the past year toward reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.

This progress reflects renewed leadership on the part of the United States in raising awareness about nuclear dangers, and fostering the international dialogue and cooperation needed to combat the nuclear threat.

Specifically, this progress includes improved international commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of international efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons; discussions with Iran to rein in its nuclear program; the announcement of an international conference of world leaders in Washington, DC in April to discuss nuclear terrorism prevention strategies; growing support for the passage of a treaty to ban nuclear testing; and negotiations between the U.S. and Russia to reduce their still-enormous nuclear weapons stockpiles.

This final step—negotiations to cut Russian and American arsenals—will be critical to advancing the nuclear security agenda.

The United States and Russia are negotiating a new treaty to succeed the landmark 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (known as START), which expired on December 5. START signaled the end of the Cold War by reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons the United States and Russia possessed, and providing for important monitoring and verification stipulations to ensure that each side complied with the treaty.

After beginning negotiations in April of last year, President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev have made tremendous strides towards completing an agreement. Once the treaty is signed, the Senate will need to approve it. Unlike most votes, however, treaty approval requires 67 “yea” votes.

A nuclear reductions treaty would greatly enhance American security. Though the Cold War ended two decades ago, the United States and Russia still possess 95 percent of the 23,000 nuclear weapons remaining in the world. Today, more nuclear weapons mean more opportunities for theft by terrorists or accidents by the hands of those controlling the stockpiles. The same weapons that provided a sense of security during the Cold War are today our gravest security threat.

The good news is that there’s strong bipartisan support for further nuclear weapons reductions. Leading Republicans, such as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Senator John McCain (R-AZ), Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), and former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, support a verifiable new nuclear reductions treaty.

Despite gains made in the past year, though, almost all the hard work of reducing nuclear dangers has yet to begin. The Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, the vulnerability of dangerous nuclear materials to theft by terrorists, and the continued risks of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear exchange between existing nuclear nations are stark reminders that the world stands on the edge of a proliferation tipping point.

Twenty-first century threats require innovative and global solutions. Reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons in the world and preventing their further spread will require concerted effort by many nations and sustained leadership from the United States.

Finalizing a treaty to succeed START is an important first step, but it is just that—a first step. 11:54 p.m. is still too late if the world ends at midnight.